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ABSTRACT 
 
The World fleet plays a crucial role in the world economy. With growth in world trade the world 
economy has expanded, facilitated largely by shipping. The profitable trading life of a ship, 
however, is limited to 25-30 years. Each year approximately 3.5 to 4 % of the world fleet or 
4,000 vessels are sent to recycling yards around the world. The majority of commercial vessels 
are dismantled in Asian countries where health and safety and environmental protection 
standards remain unacceptably low by developed world standards. At present, however, there are 
few viable alternatives, with recycling facilities in the developed world incapable of dismantling 
the largest ships, and current IMO legislation remaining voluntary and difficult to enforce. In this 
thesis the value chain responsibility of shipping companies will be discussed in the context of the 
current industry conditions in terms of market circumstances and legislative landscape. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
Motivation 
 
In 2001 the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) achieved an important environmental 
victory. All single hull tankers were to be phased out by 2015. In the aftermath of the Prestige 
accident in November 2002, the end date for the phasing out was, however, accelerated to the 
year 2010. The phasing out of single hull oil tankers is likely to have a significant effect on the 
tonnage and number of vessels to be scrapped with a major peak in the year 2010.  
 
The increase in scrapping tonnage - even though an important environmental victory in the 
operational part of the shipping industry – is likely to lead to increased human and environmental 
costs in the scrapping industry. A majority of all oil tankers are dismantled at scrapping locations 
that lack proper dismantling facilities, both in terms of equipment and in terms of local 
knowledge about dismantling.  
 
When vessels are scrapped in regions of the world like the US or the EU, firm environment, 
health and security regulations imposed by the costal state ensure that hazardous liquids like oil 
or toxic chemicals that leak from the vessels during the scrapping process are taken care of in a 
responsible manner. More than 90 % of the scrapping is, however, done in Asian developing 
countries where the regulative framework has yet to be completed, and thus protects the 
surrounding environment and the workers involved in the dismantling process only to a limited 
extent. 
 
The combination of low labour costs, limited amount of environment, health and safety 
regulation and high demand for steel in developing countries like India, Pakistan, China and 
Bangladesh, are all factors that contribute to a favourable market for ship breaking in this region 
of the world. Historically there have been no signs of scrapping sector capacity constraints. If 
new industry regulation is introduced some scrap yards may be pushed out of business, and 
capacity constraints may arise.  
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Research Question 
 
In this thesis the focus will be on value chain responsibility in the ship scrapping industry in the 
context of historical development and the current situation, including economic situation, 
legislative framework and working conditions. The research question is: 
 
In the context of the current industry conditions, in terms of the economies of ship scrapping and 
the legislative landscape, does the shipping industry admit value chain responsibility? 
 
As the volume of vessels sold for demolition is expected to reach an exceptionally high level in 
the year 2010 NGOs argue that it is important to ensure that the shipping companies 
acknowledge responsibility for the vessel from cradle to grave to avoid environmental and 
human tragedies. Due to time restrictions I have chosen to focus on one concrete case, the 
shipping company Bergesen Worldwide, which is a major industry player, to illustrate the degree 
to which the industry admits value chain responsibility. 
 
Objective 
 
The master thesis seeks to discuss current issues within the ship scrapping industry. Issues in 
connection with the scrapping industry have gained increased interest as the deadline for the 
phasing out of single hull tankers approaches. The primary objective of the thesis is to analyse 
the value chain responsibility of a shipping company like Bergesen Worldwide in the context of 
the current industry conditions in terms of market circumstances and legislative landscape. 
 
Report Design 
 
 The report has chapter 2, the background chapter, as point of departure. In this chapter 
the decision to phase out single hull tankers by 2010 is described, and a reason for the 
attention drawn to the ship scrapping industry is given.  
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 Chapter 3 outlines the methodology applied in the report to gather information and 
perform the analysis. 
 
 Three theoretical areas, described in chapter 4, the economies of ship scrapping, legal 
regulations and business ethics, build on the background chapter and determine the 
structure of the report.  
 
 Theoretical elaboration on the economies of ship scrapping is especially important for 
chapter 5, where the ship scrapping industry is described.  
 
 Chapter 6, where working conditions and impact on the local environment of ship 
scrapping are described, contributes with an impression of how human and environmental 
issues are currently treated by the shipping industry.  
 
 Theories explaining legal regulation establish a framework for understanding the current 
legislative framework of the ship scrapping industry, outlined in chapter 7.  
 
 Theories originating from the field of business ethics construct the necessary background 
for understanding whether value chain responsibility, described in chapter 8, is typically 
acknowledged in the shipping industry.  
 
 To illustrate how drivers from the three theoretical fields might affect an industry player I 
have chosen to focus on the shipping company Bergesen Worldwide. Six cases of 
Bergesen owned demolitions will be described and analysed in chapter 9 of the report.  
 
 In chapter 10 concluding remarks on my research questions are provided. 
 
 Finally, in chapter 11, recommendations for shipping companies and suggestions for 
future research are outlined. 
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Report Framework 
 
Figure 1 is meant to give an overview of how the report is built up. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Report Framework 
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CHAPTER 2 - BACKGROUND 
 
The Decision to Phase Out Single Hull Tankers 
 
The ship scrapping industry has gained much attention lately because a large increase in the 
volume of vessels sold for scrap is expected to occur in the year 2010. An important issue is 
whether the demolition market will be able to absorb the extra scrapping volume and to which 
extent new international environment, health and security regulations will affect the market 
conditions. 
  
In general two equally important factors have lead to increased scrapping volume. First of all 
international trade, which has been steadily increasing for centuries, contribute to increased 
demand for transport, and traditionally the majority of traded goods is transported by sea. In turn 
increased demand for sea transport implies that the shipping industry as a whole order more 
vessels when demand increases. When these vessels reach the end of their lives, they will be 
transferred to the last of the four shipping markets, the demolition market1. Hence, increased 
trade implies increased scrapping volume, with a time delay of approximately 20-25 years, 
which is the average life span of a vessel. Economic downturns, causing the level of international 
trade to drop, are also expected to result in increased scrapping volume because ship owners are 
unwilling to keep relatively old vessels during unfortunate economic periods. The economic 
rationale behind the scrapping decision during downturns is that it is optimal to scrap a given 
vessel if the expected value of continued trading is less than its scrap value. 
 
Secondly regulative decisions, like the decision to phase out all single hulled tankers by the year 
2010, are expected to lead to a scrapping industry volume boom. While increasing or decreasing 
trade is a longitudinal development, stretching over a relatively long period of time, the 
introduction of a new legislative framework requiring the final phase out of all single hulled 
tankers represents a sharper change in the market conditions. The phase out decision builds on 
several environmental disasters that occurred in the late 20th and early 21st century. The 
                                                 
1
 See Chapter 4, Theory, for an introduction to the four shipping markets. 
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development towards a stricter regulative framework for new building and operation of tankers is 
described in the section below. 
 
The grounding of the single hulled oil tanker Exxon Valdez outside the coast of Alaska in 1989 
and the resulting oil spill that released about 37,000 tonnes of crude oil (ITOPF Handbook) 
provoked the issuance of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). OPA 90 
commanded the phase out in US waters of all single hull tankers by the year 2015 (Birkland 
1998).  
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) reacted to the American phase out legislation in 
1992 when international requirements of double hull tankers were introduced. The Amendments 
to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, adopted in 1973) launched two new regulations, 13F and 13G, relating to design and 
construction of oil tankers. 13F concerned construction standards for new vessels and states that 
tankers ordered after 6 July 1993 are required to have double hull or an equivalent. Regulation 
13G deals with existing tankers, and requires that at 30 years of age all tankers have to comply 
with Regulation 13F and must thus be double hulled (Stopford, 2004). 
 
Another single hulled oil tanker, the 24-year old Erika, split in two off the coast of France in 
1999 and spilt 10,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea. This second major disaster forced the 
French government and the EU to take action to prevent further causalities. Besides, it forced the 
IMO to react in order to defend its position as the only international forum for legislation. 
Consequently, in 2000 the EU Parliament approved a phase out scheme for single hulled tankers 
similar to the OPA 90 proposed by the EU Commission. The proposal aimed at accelerating the 
phasing in of double-hulled tankers. The outcome was the 2001 revised version of Regulation 
13G, with a stricter phase out scheme than before, with a final end in the year 2015. 
 
When the third single hulled oil tanker, the Prestige, suffered hull damage off the coast of Spain 
in 2002 and spilt 63,000 tonnes (www.itopf.org) of oil into the sea, the EU Commission 
suggested accelerating the phase out scheme of 2010 to align with the relevant time schedule of 
the OPA 90. With the adoption of Regulation 1726/2003, the EU has, since 2003, applied the 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
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same rules for the phasing out of single hulled tankers as the US. Finally the 2003 amendments 
to Regulation 13G of Annex I to MARPOL stated that the final phasing out date for all single 
hulled tankers was accelerated to the year 2010. These amendments were given final approval in 
2004. 
 
Accidents with single hulled tankers other than those mentioned above have of course occurred 
since the 1980s. The accidents mentioned here are, however, of special interest since they have 
induced regulatory changes of great importance to the industry. 
 
Consequences for the Demolition Market 
 
 
The MARPOL and EU regulations accelerating the phase out of single hull tankers are likely to 
lead to a significant increase in scrapping volume, with a peak in 2010. Estimated future 
scrapping volumes of up to 11.0 million LDT2 (66.3 million DWT or 784 vessels) (EC-DG 
TREN 2004) in 2010 by far outrange the highest scrapping volume recorded throughout history. 
The maximum volume scrapped was recorded in 1985, when the market was extremely 
pessimistic and 38.2 million DWT of bulk carriers3 were scrapped (Fearnelys 1985). Of these 
27.1 million DWT were oil tankers. 
 
The total fleet of single hulled tankers of 5,000 DWT and above consisted of 2,256 vessels or 
129.5 million DWT as of January 2004. The LDT equivalent to the total fleet size estimated by 
the industry is 24.1 million LDT (2,256 vessels/129.5 million DWT). According to a report 
developed by the European Commission in June 2004, the decision to accelerate the phasing out 
of single hulled tankers from 2015 to 2010 will result in a 25-30 % higher scrapping volume in 
the year 2010 (EC DG-TREN 2004).  
 
Currently the supply of scrapping capacity to meet the increased volume of vessels for 
demolition is found in developing countries in Asia. There is no historical evidence of capacity 
constraints in the industry, and it is thus likely that countries with high market share in the 
                                                 
2
 LDT is the steel weight of the vessel. 
3
 Including combined carriers, oil tankers and bulk carriers. 
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scrapping market today will continue to dominate the business as the scrapping volume 
increases. It is, however, important to note that the no-capacity-constraints scenario builds on the 
assumption that the present industry conditions will prevail (EC DG-TREN 2004, p. 98). 
 
Conflict of Interests  
 
The decision to phase out single hull tankers and the expected increase in scrapping volume 
explains why the ship scrapping industry has gained much attention lately. While new 
environmental and working condition related legislation is needed to avoid future human and 
environmental disaster, the shipping industry is dependent on maintenance of the current 
situation to avoid capacity constraints. This conflict between different stakeholder interests 
shapes the background for this report. 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
 
Literature Review 
 
This report is written with an extensive literature review as point of departure. I have aimed at 
approaching the ship scrapping industry from different angles by reading material provided by 
independent researchers, political organs, shipping companies, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the world press on the topic. Unfortunately the amount of material available from 
NGOs and the world press by far outrange the material originating from the shipping companies. 
I have tried to keep this lack of balance in mind when analysing the industry.  
 
By studying literature originating from a number of different sources I hope to elucidate different 
aspects of the ship scrapping industry, including the economic, the legal, the environmental and 
the human aspect of the industry. Furthermore I hope to illustrate the controversies between two 
fundamentally different groups, the shipping companies and the NGOs.   
 
First of all material provided by independent researchers forms the platform for the theoretical 
framework presented in chapter 4. Furthermore the description of the ship scrapping industry in 
terms of the economies, the working and environmental conditions, the legislative landscape and 
value chain responsibility, which is presented in chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively, builds on a 
combination of material provided by independent researchers, research forums like the Clarkson 
Research Studies, political organs like the IMO and the ILO and NGOs like Greenpeace. Finally 
the analysis of Bergesen Worldwide in chapter 9 is based on information provided by the 
shipping company itself, empirical data from Clarkson’s database and reports from the world 
press.   
 
The drawback of applying literature review as methodology for information collection is that all 
knowledge gained must be considered second hand information. A better approach would 
perhaps have been to perform interviews, with representatives from the shipping industry, from 
the NGOs and from the ship scrapping industry. To achieve a complete picture of the industry it 
would, however, have been desirable with a substantial number of interviews. Due to the time- 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
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and financial restrictions of this study, an extensive literature review appeared as a better 
alternative than a limited number of interviews that would have been unable to cover the 
interests of all involved stakeholders. 
 
Case Study 
 
To achieve a context dependent understanding of the ship scrapping industry in terms of the 
economies of ship scrapping, the legislative landscape and the value chain responsibility of 
shipping companies, I believe that it is helpful to conduct concrete cases studies. I will thus 
describe six demolitions owned by the shipping company Bergesen Worldwide to discuss how 
the three areas of ship scrapping may affect an industry operator. A few remarks on my choice of 
case does, however, seem appropriate;  
 
Bergesen Worldwide with its six latest demolitions was initially chosen because the company is 
a major shipping industry player. The company has a significant market share in several shipping 
divisions, including dry bulk, gas and tank. Market leaders like Bergesen often possess 
considerable amounts of industry power, and are likely to be in the position to influence the 
development of the industry in which it operates. How Bergesen handles issues related to vessel 
decommissioning may thus have an effect on how the industry as a whole is likely to treat ship-
scrapping issues in the future.  
 
The six Bergesen cases, the Hesperus case in specific, have features that are typical for the ship 
scrapping industry, and illustrate a wide range of aspects that I presume to be generally valid for 
the ship-dismantling scenario. The six cases were thus chosen because they may be able to give 
an illustration of how different industry drivers affect a shipping company. 
 
The Bergesen vessels are not unique, neither in a Norwegian nor an international context. 
Thousands of obsolete vessels from OECD countries has ended and will end their lives at Asian 
ship scrapping yards. The way five of the six Bergesen vessels reached Asia, without much 
media attention, is also typical. In terms of media attention the Hesperus case is the only of the 
six demolitions that stands out as special. The vessel was subject to immense focus of attention 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
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both in Norway, in India and internationally. This attention creates a platform for analysis of 
value chain responsibility because it might uncover how a specific company treats issues 
connected to the ship scrapping industry. 
 
It is however important to keep in mind that the sole objective of the world press is to ‘sell its 
story’ (Arleth and Krogstrup 2006). The media only covers a story if it expects its audience to be 
interested in that particular story. Furthermore choice of words, pictures and interview objects 
will determine how the audience experience the situation. The Hesperus case received substantial 
media attention, in the Norwegian and Indian as well as the international press. Typically the 
stories covering the Hesperus case seem to be written to appeal to the reader’s sense of justice, 
and the shipping companies are often portrayed as irresponsible and unethical.   
 
Finally it is worth mentioning that the NGOs, like the media, are dependent on attention to 
survive and are likely to choose which cases to focus on based on this. To avoid repeating false 
statements I have aimed at verifying media accounts whenever possible by comparing the 
statements with official documents and press releases. 
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CHAPTER 4 - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis builds on a combination of theories from three fields, 
including the field of shipping economics, the field of international law and the field of business 
ethics. I have chosen to include theories derived from shipping economics because these theories 
are necessary to understand the underlying market mechanisms controlling the shipping industry 
in general and the ship scrapping industry in specific. Furthermore, theories from international 
law can contribute with a framework for understanding what a regulative regime like for instance 
the Basel Convention is, and why some national governments seem to be more reluctant in 
joining regulative regimes than others. Finally theories originating from the field of ethics are 
important because these theories can provide us with knowledge about how the maturity of moral 
reasoning may affect the development of the ship scrapping industry. 
 
The relationship between these theories and the prevailing ship scrapping industry situation is 
illustrated in figure 2: 
 
 
 
 Market Forces 
  
Moral Reasoning   Ship Scrapping Industry 
 
Legislative Framework 
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Framework 
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The Economies of Ship Scrapping   
 
This section offers an overview of the driving mechanisms of the ship scrapping industry. The 
section aims at providing the reader with an understanding of how factors connected to supply 
and demand determine when and where ships are scrapped. As an important source of 
information the June 2004 report of the European Commission, ‘Oil tanker phase out and the 
ship scrapping industry’ will be applied. The information provided in this section may serve as a 
platform for understanding how the ship scrapping industry has developed historically and how 
the sector is likely to develop in the future. 
 
The Long Term Development of Shipping 
 
Like in most industries, the business cycle, describing the development of the sector, is an 
integrated part of the shipping industry. The business cycle ensures a ‘survival of the fittest’ 
business development, where the weakest industry participants are forced out of business during 
economic downturns, leaving only the most efficient companies in business (EC DG-TREN 
2004, p. 41). The shipping industry consists of four basic markets: 
 
• The new building market trades new vessels 
• The freight market trades sea transport services 
• The sales and purchase market trades second hand vessels 
• The demolition market trades obsolete vessels 
 
Because a wide range of factors influences the business cycles and because the four shipping 
markets are highly interconnected, the development of the shipping industry is very complex. 
The business cycle manages risk and return on business investments and plays as such an 
important role in the economics of the entire shipping industry. 
 
The following example illustrates that the demand and supply of the four shipping markets is 
interconnected: ‘At a moment in time only a restricted number of new vessels are built, and at the 
same time the demand for sea transport services increase due to a world economy upturn. Due to 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
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such a situation with excess demand the price of sea transport services increases, and the 
increase in freight price affects both the second hand market and the demolition market. The 
price of second hand vessels will increase due to the increased earning potential of the vessel, 
and fewer vessels will be sold for scrap, also increasing the demolition market price. This 
development will lead to an increased number of new building orders and, eventually, to excess 
supply of sea transport services and a downward pressure on the freight rate’ (EC DG-TREN 
2004, p. 42). 
 
The demolition market has an important buffer role in the shipping industry, since it contributes 
with balance between supply and demand in the freight market. During a world economy 
recession international trade typically stagnates, creating an overcapacity in the freight market, 
sending more vessels to the scrap yards, and thus balancing out supply and demand. During an 
economic upturn the reverse development, as described above, is likely to occur. Even though it 
is a highly complex or even impossible task to predict the future development of the business 
cycles, much industry effort is each year laid down to sort out what is the most plausible 
development. 
 
The Supply Side of the Ship Scrapping Industry 
 
Historically the owner of a vessel has had positive cash inflow from two sources. The main 
source of income is cash generated in the freight market. In addition, selling a vessel in the 
second hand market or the demolition market will generate a positive cash inflow. Keeping other 
factors constant a ship owner’s decision to sell a vessel to the demolition market will be a matter 
of weighing the advantages of keeping the vessel, in terms of future expected income, against the 
advantages of selling the vessel as scrap, the achievable scrap price. It is optimal to scrap a given 
vessel if the expected value of continued trading is less than its scrap value (Strandenes 2004, 
p.10). 
 
The age of the vessel will affect the ship owner’s scrapping decision given that older vessels 
have a lower future earning potential due to higher maintenance costs. An important cost element 
for aging vessels is the regular surveys the vessels has to undergo to obtain classification and 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
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then insurance. The fifth survey, at the age of 25 years tends to be expensive and high freight 
rates are thus necessary to compensate for the increased costs if the vessel is to be held in 
operation. 
 
Ignoring possible international regulations, company policies and the cost of transporting the 
vessel to the scrapping location, the ship owner is presumably indifferent about where to scrap 
the vessel (EC DG-TREN 2004, p.43). The ship owner will choose the scrapping location that 
offers the highest scrap price for the vessel. By aggregating the individual ship owners’ 
scrapping decisions we get the total demolition supply curve. This curve illustrates the total 
number of vessels sold for scrap at any given price.  
 
 
4
 
 
 Figure 3: Demolition Supply Curve (Source: EC-DG TREN 2004)  
 
Figure 3 illustrates that there is a positive relationship between the obtainable price of an 
obsolete vessel and the volume of vessels sold for scrap. 
 
The European Commission (EC-DG TREN 2004, pp. 44-45) identifies five key drivers that may 
affect the position of the demolition supply curve. If the ship owner perceives improved market 
conditions in the freight market, the future earning potential has increased and the demolition 
                                                 
4
 It is important to note that the shape of the curve is only an illustration of the scrapping market it may be formed 
differently. 
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supply curve shifts upwards since high potential earnings encourage continued operation of the 
vessel. Secondly, if the operation costs of the vessel, that is for instance fuel costs or survey 
costs, increases the demolition supply curve shifts downwards, since the ship owner requires a 
lower price to scrap the vessel. Thirdly the supply curve shifts downwards with increasing 
average age of the existing fleet. With a high share of old vessels the ship owners will, on 
average, demand a lower price to scrap their vessel. Fourthly, a constant increase in the size of 
the current fleet will, keeping other conditions constant, lead to an increased supply of vessels 
for scrap. Finally, regulatory issues, like the decision to phase out single hulled vessels, vetting 
systems, port state control, etc., will affect the supply curve.  
 
The Demand Side of the Ship Scrapping Industry 
 
A ship scrapper’s decision to buy an obsolete vessel for scrap is affected by the possibilities to 
sell steel and other reusable items from the vessel in addition to the scrapper’s cost structure (EC 
DG-TREN 2004, p. 45). At a given steel price and a given level of running costs the scrapper 
will require buying the outranged vessel at a given price. Under changing conditions, like 
decreased steel price or increased running costs, the scrapper will require to get the vessel at a 
lower price. Both revenue possibilities and running costs, like labour costs, taxes, capital costs 
and environmental requirements are determined by local conditions. Ship scrappers in some 
regions of the world will thus be able to offer a higher scrap price than scrapper in other regions.  
 
By aggregating the decisions of the individual scrappers we get the demolition demand curve, 
which illustrates the aggregate demand for obsolete vessel at any price. In some countries the 
ship scrapping yards will only be willing to enter the scrapping market if the price of an obsolete 
vessel becomes negative, due to high running costs. Economic models do, however, assume non-
negative prices. If the future market conditions imply that shipping companies will have to pay to 
get rid of their vessels, the market situation will be illustrated through the shipping companies’ 
demand curve against the scrap yards’ supply curve. 
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The June 2004 report provided by the European Commission (EC DG-TREN 2004, p. 45 and 
128) discusses a future scenario where ship owners have to pay to get rid of their obsolete 
vessels. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Demolition Demand Curve (Source: EC-DG TREN 2004) 
 
 
According to the European Commission’s report on the ship scrapping market (EC-DG TREN 
2004, pp. 46-47), the position of the demolition demand curve will be affected by the demand for 
steel and other reusable items, the running costs of a particular scrap yard and the exchange rate. 
Among the running costs labour costs is of great importance since the ship scrapping industry is 
highly labour intensive. Furthermore local, national and international regulation is an important 
cost factor since health, safety and environment regulation increases running costs. Finally better 
infrastructure reduces running costs. Exchange rates affect the competitiveness of a certain 
country since the running costs of a scrapping yard is paid in local currency. 
 
Low demand for second hand steel and high running costs explains why European ship scrapping 
yards are almost absent from the demolition market today. In an unregulated world market where 
ship owners are indifferent about where to scrap, European scrap yards are not competitive. 
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The Equilibrium Solution 
 
 
Figure 5: Supply and Demand of Ships for Demolition (Source: EC-DG TREN 2004) 
 
 
The interaction of the supply and demand curves determines the amount of vessels scrapped (q*) 
and the market price (p*) in a competitive market. As the scrap price decreases scrappers will 
demand more vessels and vice versa.  
 
Throughout history the scrap yards have had to pay for obsolete vessels. Given certain conditions 
ship owners will have to pay scrap yards to decommission their vessels, though (EC-DG TREN 
2004, pp. 48-49). In the case of for instance the future phase out of all single hull vessels such a 
situation may arise. The supply of obsolete vessels increases to a level where high running cost 
yards find it profitable to enter the market. If ship owners are not willing to pay for the scrapping 
process the result might be a ghost fleet of outranged vessels without value. If the excess supply 
situation is temporary, it will again be possible to obtain positive cash inflow from the scrap 
market. 
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Market Drivers Influencing Supply and Demand 
 
Change in important market drivers like freight rate, international regulation, steel prices and 
market interactions ensure that the ship scrapping market is not static but dynamic (EC DG-
TREN 2004, p. 49). First of all peaks in the freight rate is transferred to the demolition market 
with a small delay. High freight rates reduce the incentive to scrap old vessels and the supply 
curve is shifted upwards.  
 
Regulations like the phase out scheme, which force ship owners to scrap their vessels earlier than 
they would otherwise have done, increase the supply of vessels to the demolition market. If ‘low 
cost’ scrappers’ capacity is filled up, demand from ‘high cost’, often European, scrappers might 
be satisfied. Furthermore, regulations concerning health, safety and environment my influence 
the demand for obsolete vessels by increasing running costs. Regulation on these areas is often 
implemented only locally, while the ship scrapping market is global, and it is plausible that new 
regulation only affects some of the ship scrappers, in some cases pushing these operators out of 
the market. 
 
A higher level of scrapping due to higher steel prices could affect the market price for steel. 
However, second hand steel from obsolete vessels constitutes only a marginal part of the total 
supply of steel, and the price of steel must hence be considered as exogenous in the scrapping 
context. 
 
Finally market interactions introduced by international organs like IMO, ILO or the Basel 
Convention guidelines might influence ship owners’ decision about where to scrap their vessel. 
If for instance high cost, environmentally friendly scrap yards are subsidised the incentive to 
scrap at these locations is increased. Furthermore control regulation can ensure that scrap yards 
applying dangerous or environmentally threatening procedures are pushed out of the market. 
Control regulation will, however, require global support to be effective. 
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Capacity 
 
In chapter 5 we will see that historically there is no evidence of capacity constraints in the ship 
scrapping industry. New regulations on health, safety and security may, however, result in 
capacity constraints as the volume of vessels sold for scrap peaks in the year 2010.   
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International Law 
 
Even though market mechanisms caused by shifting supply and demand conditions affecting the 
four shipping markets are important to the development of the ship scrapping industry, other 
factors such as regulation and political resolutions can have an equally significant effect on the 
market situation. As the regulative situation is today the ship scrapping industry will be able to 
meet future increased demand for ship scrapping services that will arise due to the political 
decision to phase out all single hull tankers. However, if new environmental or working 
condition related regulations are introduced and signed by affected nations, the terms of the 
industry will be changed, some ship breakers may be forced to shut down their business, and it 
may not be enough capacity to meet the need for scrapping services. It is thus necessary to 
understand the mechanisms of the regulative situation. To achieve such an understanding it may 
be helpful to use a theoretical framework. 
 
Environmental Regimes 
 
Environmental issues were not addressed in theories about international relations before the late 
1980s. Since then the notion of ‘environmental regimes’ has been an important element in 
theories concerning relations across borders. Typically new legislation is introduced through 
regimes and affects the national states that have signed the treaties of the regime (Arleth and 
Krogstrup 2006). Regimes have been defined in a number of ways, but the definition below, 
developed by Stephan Krasener, is frequently referred to ((e.g. (Baylis 2001), (Keohane 1982), 
(Keohane 1989), (Young 1993a), (Jakobsen 2000), (Hansen1997)). 
 
“Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international 
relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice”. (Krasner 1983) 
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This definition reveals that regimes are defined not only by a common understanding of which 
rules apply to a certain area of international regulations, but also the common understanding of 
which norms are relevant for the specific area. An example of a regime governing international 
environmental relations is the Basel Convention. The countries that have signed the Basel 
Convention will, theoretically, share a common understanding of how hazardous waste is to be 
treated. The international regimes are built up around legislation and rules, and when legislation 
changes, the regime changes.  
 
Some industries, like the ship scrapping industry, has characteristics that ensure that it falls 
under, or in some cases between, several regimes with different degrees of institutionalisation 
(Arleth and Krogstrup 2006). The issues that arise when vessels are traded internationally with 
the purpose of scrapping may potentially fall under the regulation of environmental regimes such 
as the Basel Convention or under trade regimes such as the WTO. So far the international 
community has not been able to decide whether ship scrapping should primarily be subject to 
trade regulation or environmental regulation. Consequently both trade and environmental 
regimes and the development of legislation in these regimes affect the sector. Problems arise 
when the legislation of the regimes involved come to different conclusions. 
 
Willingness to Sign Treaties 
 
Another problem in the ship scrapping industry is that some national governments seem to be 
less willing to sign treaties and engage in international regimes protecting the environment and 
ensuring improved working conditions than others. Researchers have attempted to explain the 
varying willingness to sign treaties through domestic and international factors (Sprinz 1992).  
 
Detlef Sprinz (1992) has developed the conceptual framework below for understanding why 
some national governments hesitate when it comes to support of international policy decisions: 
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A Conceptual Model of Support for International Environmental Regulation 
 
  
 
Figure 6: A conceptual model 
Source: Sprinz 1992 p. 11 
 
 
Previous research on domestic and international environmental regulation has emphasized the 
role of environmental damages and the perception thereof, societal actors in the form of interest 
groups, for instance environmental groups or green parties, and resources at the disposal of 
countries, such as wealth and technology (Sprinz 1992). Given these constraining factors 
national governments will seek to maximize utility, and, if other factors are held constant, 
national governments will seek to maximize the degree of domestic environmental quality. In 
practice, this means that national governments have to balance competing goals, namely 
environmental and non-environmental goals (Ibid.). National preference for long term ecological 
sustainability that trumps preferences for short term profit opportunities is likely to lead to a 
willingness to sign stringent international environmental agreements, which after implementation 
will result in reduced pollution.  
 
The framework presented above may also apply to international regulation of worker’s rights. 
Frequently national governments have to weigh the interests of national workers against profit 
opportunities. The existence of interest groups, technology and wealth is again likely to affect the 
government’s willingness to sign international treaties. 
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International Incentives 
 
According to Keohane and Nye (1989) the vulnerability of states to international pollution, 
which will be asymmetrical, ensures that the most vulnerable countries will pursue policies of 
highly stringent environmental regulation. Prittwitz (1990) assumes that the aggregate interest of 
a country is determined by its composition of polluter interests, that is advantages of continuing 
polluting activities, victim interests, that is the perceived adverse impacts of pollutant activities, 
and third party interests, that is the interests of producers of abatement and substitution 
technologies. Countries with dominant polluting interests are, according to Prittwitz (1990), not 
likely to agree to international environmental regulation, whereas the opposite is true for 
countries that have strong victim interests. The work of Keohane and Nye (1989) and Prittwitz 
(1990) illustrates that a government’s willingness to sign international treaties depends on a 
combination of its ecological vulnerability and its interests. Furthermore Sprinz (1992) suggests 
that an important measurable factor in a country’s interest is the amount of abatement costs5 it 
will be exposed to by signing international regulations. The relationship is illustrated below: 
 
  
Figure 7: Environmental interests 
Source: Sprinz (1992), p. 36 
 
 
According to Sprinz (1992) ‘pushers’ are more willing to engage in international environmental 
regulation than ‘intermediates’ or ‘bystanders’; in turn, members of the latter two groups are 
more likely to be in favor of international regulation than ‘draggers’ are. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Abatement cost is the cost of reduction or removal of an undesired item or effect like for instance pollution or 
human exposure to hazardous waste. 
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Domestic Political Factors 
 
In addition to the international factors mentioned above, several domestic characteristics may 
affect a country’s willingness to engage in international regimes protecting the environment or 
workers’ rights. First of all the attitudes of concerned parties seems to be important. The 
development of post materialism in Western Europe has lead to the establishment of interest 
groups like green parties and environment movements in this part of the world. It seems 
plausible to assume that countries with high shares of post materialists, on the level of mass 
publics and elites, will be willing to spend scarce resources on international environmental 
regulation. Furthermore factors like exposure to environmental hazards, socio-economic status 
and concern for the quality of the environment on the national and international level, have been 
suggested by researchers as possible domestic explanatory factors affecting willingness to sign 
international treaties (Rohrschneider 1988, and Sprinz 1990). 
 
In addition to the influence of interest groups, resources (wealth and technology) have been 
pointed out as a factor influencing willingness to engage in international agreements. According 
to Prittwitz (1990) countries with sufficient resources will be able to undertake environmental 
policies. Furthermore, the presence of abatement technology (i.e., end-of-pipe and process 
control technologies) or integrated technologies (which avoid or reduce pollution by modifying 
production processes) may allow countries to adopt policies that lead to substantial 
improvements of their environmental quality. Overall wealth of resources should be associated 
with ambitious environmental policies (Sprinz 1992). 
 
 
Summing up one could say that the development of the regimes governing an industry and the 
involved countries’ willingness to sign international treaties will probably affect the development 
of the industry.  
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Business Ethics 
 
The third theoretical field that may contribute in explaining the development of the ship 
scrapping industry is the field of ethics. Theories describing levels of ethical development may 
be able to provide us with some knowledge about the extent to which norms and values affect the 
operation of the industry. The objective of this thesis is, as earlier mentioned, to reveal whether 
the shipping industry admits value chain responsibility. To simplify the analysis a major industry 
player, Bergesen Worldwide, has been in focus. Such an understanding of responsibility is likely 
to be connected to level of ethical development.  
 
Traditional theories describing ethical development through stages are typically applied at the 
level of the individual (Kohlberg 1971). However, the analytical ideas and methods have been 
developed and are frequently applied at a corporate level (Reidebach and Robin 1991, 
Falkenberg 2004). If the theories are applied at a corporate level, the way the corporation acts 
upon the surrounding world is in focus. Through an analysis of an important corporation’s choice 
of behaviour in different cases it may be possible to get an impression of the industry’s level of 
ethical development. 
 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s Framework 
 
In this report I have chosen to apply the conceptual model developed by Lawrence Kohlberg 
(1971). Kohlberg suggested three stages of moral development each with two subcategories 
resulting in a total of six stages. The stages are pre-conventional moral reasoning, conventional 
and post-conventional moral reasoning.  
 
The pre-conventional stages of moral reasoning is characterised by a rather egoistic view of 
ethics. The individual or the corporation acts to avoid pain and seek pleasure. Economic theories 
like transaction cost economics and principal agent theory both assumes that man is 
opportunistic and selfish and that control and incentive mechanisms are needed to achieve 
desired behaviour. Theories like these assume pre-conventional moral development as rule of 
thumb – the corporation has as its sole objective to maximise own profit without regard for the 
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environment or the well-being of people affected by its actions (Falkenberg 2004). Within the 
bounds of legality cost-benefit calculations will determine what the ultimate strategy is.  
 
Supporters of utilitarianism like John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith (Mill 1863 and Smith 1776) 
have described the second pre-conventional stage of development. Mill and Smith believed that 
it is the responsibility of the corporation to produces as much good as possible, for all, at a macro 
level. Human rights are, however, not important to utilitarians, and utilitarianism, like ethical 
egoism, must be seen as a representative of consequential perspectives where cost-benefit 
calculation is the analytical tool. But unlike ethical egoism utilitarianism has a long-term 
perspective and does not focus on maximised profit for anyone individual or company. 
 
The third and the fourth stage of moral reasoning are based on adhering to the conventions of 
ones immediate group (stage three) or of the society as a whole (stage four). The individual or 
the firm does what is expected by the local culture and what most people consider to be ‘right’. 
The conventions of a particular society have been developed through local institutions over time. 
Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North 1990). 
Institutions include the legal and regulatory framework as well as the norms, values, customs and 
patterns of behaviour present at particular place at a given time (Falkenberg 2004). The will of 
the people is represented in the institutions or the conventions that have been developed through 
a democratic process. Consequently different cultures and societies will have different sets of 
institutions.  
 
In developed countries institutions have been changed by movements like labour movements, 
consumer movements, environmental movements, civil rights movements and the like over a 
long period of time, changing how people think of right and wrong and what economic 
organisations can and cannot do. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been important 
contributors in this process, especially in Western cultures. However, to adhere to local 
institutions does not ensure ethical behaviour (Ibid.). In several developing economies the 
institutions are inadequate, unable to protect local environment and inhabitants. In these 
economies it is not sufficient simply to adhere to local conventions to act morally responsible. 
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Moral reasoning at the conventional stage will allow cost-benefit calculations to direct behaviour 
within the bounds of local institutions. 
 
In economies with inadequate institutions conventional moral reasoning allows the company to 
take full advantage of the local conditions by for instance hiring and exploiting young children, 
expose employees to hazardous working conditions or release toxic waste to the water or to the 
air. 
 
When institutions are inadequate, moral reasoning at a post-conventional level is necessary to 
protect people and the environment. In the fifth and the sixth stage of moral development a set of 
autonomous, universal ethical principles is developed to determine what is right and what is 
wrong. Ethical principles are followed not because ‘good ethics pays’ or because conventions 
expect that the principles are followed, but simply because it is right to act in adherence with the 
principles. The principles of justice or human rights should trump utilitarian considerations 
(Brandise 1932). In practice it is difficult to ensure that economic organisations are always able 
to judge what is right and what is wrong. It is tempting to apply cost-benefit calculations in a 
similar manner as in developed countries in developing countries, and a good set of institutions is 
thus important. In a situation where behaviour is regulated by laws, norms and values it is easier 
to compete with integrity. 
 
Five principles of ethical behaviour may provide international organisations with guidelines for 
post-conventional moral reasoning (Falkenberg 2004). First of all the principle of equality 
implies that humans may not be treated differently based on who they are in terms of for instance 
gender, age, race, religion, etc. Everyone should have equal rights, equal opportunities and be 
considered equal before law.  
 
Secondly the principle of just institutions encourages the company to see their acts from another 
person’s point of view. Do I want my act to become a generally accepted principle? Do I want all 
others to pollute as much as I do for the same reasons as I do it? Do I want to work under the 
same conditions as my employees do? According to Falkenberg (1996) three basic principles 
have to be promoted to ensure just institutions; survival, equality of moral value and distribution 
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of index good according to the maxi-min principle. Survival includes a minimum of nutrition, 
health and education and consumption at a level that ensures survival of future generations. The 
equality principle was discussed above. The maxi-min principle states that in case of inequality 
those who have the least should get the most.  
 
Thirdly the principle of rights and duties states that a firm shall not deprive anyone from their 
rights, in addition the firm shall protect the rights of the individual and aid those who have been 
deprived from their rights. The firm has obligations towards individuals who are directly or 
indirectly affected by its activities. 
 
Fourth the principle of integrity states that in situations where the background institutions are 
inadequate, the firm has to develop a set of values that sets standards above the locally required 
minimum level (De George 1993). According to De George (1993) a MNC (Multi National 
Company) should do no intentional direct harm, it should produce more good than harm, it 
should contribute to the development of the local community, it should respect human rights and 
the local culture, it should pay its share of local taxes and it should cooperate with the local 
government.  
 
Finally the principle of responsibility declares that the company is morally responsible of 
reducing harmful effects and causing desirable effects if it is capable of doing so.  
 
If a firm is able to follow the five guidelines or principles of ethical behaviour described above it 
has reached the highest level of moral reasoning, the post-conventional level. However, in 
addition to its own actions, the firm may have some responsibility for acts conducted by 
upstream or downstream members of its value chain. A MNC may for instance be powerful 
enough to control the behaviour of its upstream suppliers or its downstream customers. 
According to the principle of responsibility the MNC may be responsible of changing the 
behaviour of the other value chain members if it is capable of doing so.  
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CHAPTER 5 - THE SHIP SCRAPPING INDUSTRY 
 
The purpose of this part of the report is to establish a platform of general knowledge about the 
ship scrapping industry. The development of the industry will be outlined in terms of choice of 
scrapping location, level of scrapping volume and level of scrap prices during the last decade. 
Furthermore prognoses for future level and capacity of scrapping will be discussed. Theoretically 
the chapter builds on the economies of ship scrapping, described in chapter 4. 
 
History of the Ship Scrapping Industry 
 
Ship scrapping can be defined as the process of dismantling an obsolete vessel’s structure for 
scrapping or disposal (www.osha.gov). A wide range of activities are included in the process, 
spanning from removing all gear and equipment to cutting down and recycling the vessel’s 
structure. Due to the structural complexity of the vessel and the numerous health, security and 
environment issues involved, the dismantling process is a challenging operation. The main 
component of an obsolete vessel is steel, which can be reused in a number of industries and 
businesses. Unfortunately most vessels also contain several hazardous components. 
 
Scrapping Location 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s vessels were mainly scrapped in mechanised, capital-intensive 
operations in Europe, notably in Spain and Italy, and in the US. During this period ship 
scrapping took place along piers in connection with ship building activities. As the level of 
environmental regulation in industrialised countries increased during the 1980s, costs of 
complying with the standards also increased. Consequently most of the ship scrapping industry 
was transferred to developing Asian countries, first to China, Taiwan and South Korea, then to 
Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (see map below). These countries attracted the scrapping 
industry due to low wages and a low degree of compliance with international standards of 
environment, health and security (ILO 2004).  
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Geographic Move of the Ship Scrapping Industry 
 
 
Picture 1: Geographic Move 
 
During the 1980s beaching as a method, which was initiated by an accidental beaching6, became 
the most frequently applied method since it allows the demand for infrastructure (piers, sufficient 
depth of the harbour, cranes etc.) to be replaced by a mud flat and a huge labour force. To take 
full advantage of the low labour costs in the developing countries the industry, which had been 
highly capital intensive in high-labour-cost Europe, became labour intensive. As the economy 
grew in Korea and Taiwan, labour costs increased and ship scrapping became less attractive in 
these countries. India, Bangladesh, China and Pakistan, which are countries with relatively low 
labour costs, became the new market leaders in the scrapping industry from 1988 onwards.  
 
The reason for the current geographical distribution of demolition services is thus that the 
economics of ship scrapping are not favourable for most developed countries. Higher labour 
costs, costs of protecting the environment and human health and lower demand for second hand 
steel and other reusable items than Asian developing countries ensures that the EU and other 
                                                 
6
 The method of beaching started automatically when a 20,000 DWT vessel was driven ashore by a devastating tidal 
bore in 1965. That was the first ship scrapped on the Chittagong beach in Bangladesh. (Rahman and Ullah 1999). 
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developed regions do not attract supply of obsolete vessels. Per tonne steel prices obtainable in 
Asia are higher than those obtainable in Europe (EC DG-TREN 2004). 
 
Scrapping Volume 
 
During the last 10 years ship breaking in Asia has accounted for more than 90 % (see table 1) of 
the total volume scrapped (LDT). The number of OECD countries that have operating ship-
dismantling facilities is limited. Less than 2 % of the ship scrapping in the period from 1997 to 
2006 was carried out in Europe. Of these 2 % Turkey accounts for more than 85 %. Demolition 
of obsolete fishing ships and navy vessels do occur, but no larger vessels are scrapped in OECD 
countries (www.mst.dk). 
 
Location 
 
Unit 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Bangladesh mLDT 
mDWT 
No. 
0.7 
3.2 
63 
1.1 
5.8 
66 
1.2 
7.2 
65 
0.8 
4.2 
61 
1,7 
9,5 
123 
1.4 
8.7 
69 
0.7 
5.5 
52 
1.6 
6.0 
90 
1.5 
3.8 
69 
0.2 
1.6 
38 
10.9 
55,5 
696 
India mLDT 
mDWT 
No. 
2.1 
7.7 
293 
2.8 
10.0 
360 
2.8 
10.6 
340 
2.1 
8.1 
274 
2.2 
8.1 
298 
2.9 
11.1 
326 
2.2 
8.3 
279 
0,9 
1.8 
116 
0.6 
1.1 
44 
0.1 
0.2 
16 
18.7 
67.0 
2,346 
Pakistan mLDT 
mDWT 
No. 
0.2 
0.9 
14 
0.6 
3.4 
40 
0.7 
4.3 
34 
0.2 
1.2 
16 
0.6 
3.7 
26 
0.3 
1.7 
13 
0.2 
1.3 
25 
0.1 
0.3 
11 
0.0 
0.1 
4 
0.0 
0.0 
1 
2.9 
16.9 
184 
China mLDT 
mDWT 
No. 
0.0 
0.1 
6 
0.5 
2.1 
48 
1.0 
5.4 
72 
1.1 
5.7 
77 
1.1 
5.7 
76 
1.3 
5.9 
90 
1.5 
10.9 
131 
0.7 
1.8 
47 
0.2 
0.4 
17 
0.0 
0.1 
3 
7.4 
38.1 
567 
Other mLDT 
mDWT 
No. 
0.8 
3.4 
71 
0.6 
2.6 
85 
0.7 
3.3 
89 
0.6 
2.6 
64 
0.3 
1.2 
42 
0.3 
1.1 
58 
0.7 
1.2 
67 
0.2 
0.1 
24 
0.1 
0.2 
36 
0.0 
0.1 
3 
4.3 
16.3 
539 
Total mLDT 
mDWT 
No. 
3.8 
15.3 
447 
5.6 
23.9 
599 
6.4 
30.8 
600 
4.8 
21.8 
492 
5.9 
28.2 
565 
6.2 
28.5 
556 
5.3 
26.8 
521 
3.5 
10.0 
282 
2.4 
5.8 
166 
0.3 
1.9 
50 
44.2 
193.3 
4,332 
 
Table 1: Total historical scrapping volumes by region and year  
Source: Clarkson 2006 
Note: 2006 includes only January to April 
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The table above is based on data from Clarkson Research (2006). The data is compiled from 
Clarkson’s fleet database in April 2006. This database covers a wide range of data on demolition, 
including type of vessel, size of vessel, location of scrapping, scrap price, etc.  
 
During the period from 1997 to 2006 approximately 4,300 vessels have been dismantled 
globally. The level of activity has varied significantly throughout the period. The ship scrapping 
activity peaked in 1999 when 600 ships representing about 6.4 million LDT were scrapped and 
dipped in 2005 when only 170 ships representing 2.0 million LDT were scrapped. This pattern of 
historical scrapping is found across a number of different sources, for instance (Clarkson 2006), 
and (EC-DG TREN 2004).   
 
Since 2004 the number of vessels sold to scrap yards has been low. Booming freight rates across 
all shipping sectors have been the cause of this scrapping drought as the tight demand/supply 
balance means owners choose to keep older ships, which in a weaker demand environment 
would have been scrapped, operating. A strong freight market and few candidates for demolition 
are the two most important reasons for the demolition drought (see chapter 4). However, 
campaigns of environmental lobbies such as Greenpeace have drawn attention to the poor and 
dangerous conditions that many workers in the dismantling industry have to endure and these 
campaigns have, according to Clarkson Research Studies (2005), also contributed to the low 
scrapping volumes.  
 
Scrapping Prices 
 
The balance of demand and supply in the scrapping market determines the price obtainable for 
an obsolete vessel. The development of prices during the last decade is illustrated in the figure 
below. The price obtainable in the demolition market and the volume of decommissioning is 
negatively correlated, indicating that when volumes increase, the price of an obsolete vessel 
decreases. This relationship indicates that factors other than the scrap price, for instance the 
freight market rate, determine when a ship owner decides to sell the ship for scrap. 
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 Figure 8: Average scrap price and scrap volume by year of scrap 
Source: Clarkson 2006 
 
According to the Platou report on the demolition market (www.platou.com) from 2006 the 
current level of scrapping is the lowest since the early 1990s. This historically low supply of 
vessels for scrap has, as illustrated above, lead to a significant increase in scrap prices during the 
period from 2004 to 2006, confirming the negative correlation between scrap price and scrap 
volume. The high level of scrap prices may primarily be explained by two factors. First of all the 
massive demand for second hand steel for the construction industry in China has increased the 
demand for obsolete vessels for scrap. Secondly the strong freight market has, as mentioned 
above, limited the supply of vessels for scrap. Even though scrap rates have been high, few 
vessels have been scrapped, indicating the importance of the high freight rates to ship owners.  
 
Figure 9 illustrates the strong negative correlation between freight rates and demolition on a 
monthly basis for 2004. During the first half of 2004 tanker earnings moved into decline. VLCC 
earnings fell from $110,000/day in January to $40,000/day in May, and scrapping responded by 
increasing significantly (Clarkson Research Studies 2005). Scrapping stayed high until June and 
then fell in August when earnings skyrocketed. During 2005 and the first quarter of 2006 freight 
rates have remained high and scrapping has been correspondingly low. If signs of freight market 
weakening appear an increase in supply of old vessel is likely, though. 
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Figure 9: Monthly demolition and freight rates 2004 
Source: Clarkson Research Studies (2005) 
 
Future Prognoses 
 
The future volume of vessels sold for decommissioning is likely to be significantly affected by 
the implementation of IMO MARPOL 13G regulation and the amendments to this regulation, 
both of which were introduced in the background chapter of this report. The implementation of 
regulation 13G and its amendments will affect the volume of single hulled oil tankers sold for 
scrap. I will first turn to an approach for estimating future level of single hull oil tanker 
decommissioning. Secondly an approach for estimating future level of ship scrapping volume in 
other shipping segments is introduced. The approaches for future scrapping volumes estimation 
is based on an analysis performed by the European Commission (EC-DG TREN 2004). 
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Single Hull Oil Tankers 
 
Single hull oil tankers, which consist of both single skin (SS) oil tankers and oil tankers with 
double sides (DS) or double bottom (DB), are divided into three categories in the regulation 
(www.imo.org (4)): 
 
• Category 1: This category covers single hull tankers over 20,000 DWT carrying crude 
oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of single hull tankers over 
30,000 DWT carrying oil other than the above, which do not comply with the 
requirements for protectively located segregated ballast tanks.  
• Category 2: This category covers single hull tankers over 20,000 DWT carrying crude 
oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of single hull tankers over 
30,000 DWT carrying oil other than the above, which do comply with the requirements 
for protectively located segregated ballast tanks.  
• Category 3: This category covers single hull oil tankers over 5,000 DWT, but less than 
specified under the two first categories.  
 
The phase out date of a vessel will mainly depend on which category it is subject to. See 
appendix I for an illustration of the age profile of the current fleet of single hull oil tankers. 
 
Other Shipping Segments 
 
The estimates for shipping segments other than single hulled oil tankers may be accomplished 
through four steps: 
 
1. The age profile of the existing fleet for each shipping segment is estimated. 
2. The decommissioning frequency function, which shows the share of vessels scrapped at a 
certain age, is estimated for each segment.  
3. The conditional decommissioning frequency function is estimated on the basis of the 
decommissioning frequency function. The conditional decommissioning function 
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expresses the probability that a vessel is scrapped in the following year conditional on 
being in operation at the beginning of the year. 
4. Combining the estimated age profile and the fitted conditional decommissioning 
frequency function for each segment, estimates of the future decommissioning volumes 
are obtained. By adding these for all segments, the aggregate estimates of future volumes 
of scrapping of all other vessels than single hull oil tankers are reached. 
 
The table in appendix II illustrates the age distribution of the current (April 2006) fleet of vessels 
other than single hull oil tankers. It is worth noting that some segments have seen massive new 
building during the last years. In for instance the segment for double hull oil tankers almost 80 % 
of the vessels are less than 10 years old. This distribution mirrors the ordering boom that came in 
the wake of the phase out plan for single hull tankers. The container segment has a similar age 
profile, reflecting the growth in the industry. The growth in new building will be reflected in the 
demolition market with a delay of 20-30 years. 
 
The decommissioning frequency function shows the share of vessels scrapped at a certain age. 
Around 14% of the vessels scrapped were for example scrapped at the age of 25 years. The 
conditional frequency function shows, for example, that given a vessel has reached the age of 28 
the probability that the vessel is scrapped in the following year is around 30%. 
 
 
Figure 10: Frequency functions 
Source: EC-DG TREN (2004) 
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Future Scrapping Volume 
 
In this section it is assumed that single hull oil tankers are phased out on at the dates specified in 
Regulation 13G Annex I. The total fleet of single hull oil tankers represents 24.1 million LDT 
(2,256 vessels/129.5 million DWT), of which 7.1 million LDT (523 vessels/35.0 million DWT) 
are category 1 tankers. Based on the dates in the regulation (www.imo.org (4)) the phase out of 
single hull oil tankers is estimated by the European Commission to peak in 2010, with an 
estimated volume of 11.0 million LDT (66.3 million DWT or 784 vessels). INTERTANKO 
operates with a similar estimate for 2010 of 67 million DWT (2005). 
 
For other shipping segments the volume of future scrapping is estimated by the European 
Commission to fluctuate around 5 to 8 million LDT per year in the period from 2005 to 2018. 
The current very strong freight market may have an influence on this estimate, though. The 
estimate is based on the age profile of the current fleet, which reveals a relatively high number of 
old vessels. The estimated increase in scrapped vessels from 2014 onwards reflects the large 
volume of vessels ordered and delivered during the last decade. The graph below illustrates total 
expected scrapping volume as estimated by the European Commission in 2004. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Total expected scrapping volume 
Source: EC-DG TREN (2004) 
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Figure 11 illustrates the overall trend in ship scrapping volume, but does not take into account 
ups and downs in the market caused by for instance fluctuating freight rates. The graph is based 
on the age profile of the 2004 fleet and the dates of phase out determined in Regulation 13G 
(www.imo.org (4)). 
 
Capacity 
 
The real challenge of the ship scrapping industry appears, according to the estimate described 
above, in 2010. Without new environmental or working condition related regulations imposed by 
international organs it is unlikely that this increase in supply of obsolete vessels will lead to 
capacity constraints. The excess supply is, on the other hand, likely to put a downward pressure 
on the scrap prices, to the benefit of scrap yards. In theory, a situation where ship owners would 
have to pay for the dismantling of their vessels may arise. Under circumstances like these some 
ship owners may decide to wait until the price obtainable for their vessel is positive again, and a 
fleet of non-operating vessels will exist for a period. 
 
By estimating a sum of maximum annual scrapping activity per country during the period from 
1996 to 2005 a lower bound for maximum scrapping capacity may be estimated (method 
developed by BIMCO, 2001). By applying this method the lower capacity bound is estimated to 
8.3 million LDT, which should be compared with the estimated future peak year 2010, when the 
scrap volume is expected to be approximately 16.7 million LDT. 
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Scrapping Location 
 
Maximum LDT per year (1996-2005) 
Bangladesh 1.7 
India 2.9 
Pakistan 0.7 
Indian Sub Continent 0.3 
China 1.9 
Vietnam 0.1 
Other Asia 0.0 
EU 0.0 
Turkey 0.1 
North America 0.0 
South America 0.0 
Mexico 0.1 
Other/Unknown 0.0 
Total 8.3 
 
Table 2: Maximum scrapping activity 1996-2005 by country (all vessels) (million LDT) 
 
 
 
One may assume that the countries have not utilised their potential scrapping capacity during this 
period, though. The upper bound of the ship scrapping capacity might be significantly higher 
than the lower bound. According to the European Commission it is, however, impossible to 
estimate the upper bound of scrapping capacity (EC-DG TREN 2004). Asian countries offer 
beaches, cheap labour and a hinterland that demands second hand steel. So far the market drivers 
behind supply and demand have determined the level of scrapping and the equilibrium scrap 
price. The EU (EU 2000) states that the only plausible constraint to future scrapping capacity is 
environmental and working condition related regulation.  
Source: Clarkson 
Research Studies 
(2006) 
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CHAPTER 6 - WORKING CONDITIONS AND IMPACT ON THE LOCAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
In this chapter various implications for human health and the environment of the ship 
dismantling industry are briefly presented. Environment, health and security issues are discussed 
to give an idea about the differing opinions on the subjects. Towards the end of the chapter a 
European scrapping initiative will be described to illustrate how ship dismantling can be 
performed without causing harm to the environment or human health. In the next chapter I will 
turn to a description and discussion about the regulative framework currently surrounding the 
ship scrapping industry. 
 
According to the International Metalworker’s Federation (IMF) ship dismantling is among the 
most labour intensive and dangerous occupations existing (www.imfmetal.org). Employees in 
the ship scrapping industry are exposed to hazards like asbestos and other toxic materials, which 
they remove from the vessels by hand, risks of explosions, lack of basic safety equipment and a 
number of other safety restricting conditions (Arleth and Krogstrup 2006). Toxic materials that 
are forbidden to use in new building of vessels today are possible to discover in outranged 20-30 
years old vessels. The most common toxic materials and components are listed below: 
 
Toxic components and materials found in outranged vessels: 
 
• Asbestos 
• PBC (polychlorinated biphenyls) 
• Hydraulic fluids 
• Lead from paint, lead ballast, batteries, generators and motor components 
• Tributyltin (TBT) antifouling coatings and contaminated holding tanks. 
• Heavy metals from ship transducers, ballast and paint coatings 
• Mercury from fluorescent light tubes, thermometers, electrical switches, light fittings, fire 
detectors and tank level indicators 
• Cloroflorocarbons (CFCs) in self-contained refrigeration devices such as water coolers 
and small freezer units 
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• Flammable liquids such as lubricants and residual fuel 
 
(Greenpeace 1999) (www.osha.gov) 
 
Working Conditions 
 
To describe the conditions under which employees in the ship scrapping industry work, a report 
developed by NorWatch after a visit in Chittagong, Bangladesh in 1999 (www.norwatch.no) will 
be applied. This report describes working conditions at Bangladesh’s largest yards in terms of 
wages and contract relations, working environment and safety, local environmental impact, 
living conditions and consequences for local settlements. According to Greenpeace 
(www.greenpeaceweb.org (1)) the working conditions on scrap yards in India, China and 
Bangladesh are quite similar, and the description of the Bangladeshi conditions are thus assumed 
to be representative for the industry in general. Photographs and analyses of samples collected at 
the docks document the findings in the report. It may be problematic to apply a report developed 
by an NGO, since NGOs are seldom neutral in their description of the situation. It has, however, 
been difficult to find any information about local scrap yard circumstances originating from 
other sources. 
 
 
 
Picture 2: Bangladesh:  Ship breaking without protection. 
(www.norwatch.no) 
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Wages and Contract Relations 
 
According to the report few employees are employed directly by the scrapping company. In 
Bangladesh’s largest ship scrapping yard about 1000 people are at work during NorWatch’s visit.  
Among these 50 are employed be the scrapping company, the rest are employed by a variety of 
sub vendors with different responsibilities during the scrapping process. According to 
Community Development Centre (CODEC) Bangladesh has a minimum legal wage level of 100 
Taka (about 15 NOK) a day. Despite this the start wage for the youngest workers is 40 Taka a 
day. Even though the wage level is below the legal minimum, there is, according to NorWatch, 
little opposition detectable among the workers. Most of the workers are employed at short-term 
contracts, and short-term employees are entitled fewer rights. 
 
Bangladesh has ratified ILO convention number 59, where the minimum age for industry work is 
15 years. Even though the ship scrapping industry is included in the convention workers below 
15 years are employed and perform vital ship breaking operations in Bangladesh. 
 
The average wage level at the Bangladeshi yards is 2000 Taka (about 350 NOK) a month. Even 
though the cost of living in Bangladesh is relatively low, this level of payment is not able to 
secure more than an absolute minimum (www.norwatch.no). 
 
Working Environment and Safety 
 
One of the reasons why Asian beaches are chosen as locations for ship dismantling is the huge 
difference between high and low tide. The difference ensures that it is possible to pull the large 
vessels up during high tide. From the entrance of the scrap yard in Chittagong to the waterline it 
is about 300 meters at high tide. At low tide the waterline subtracts another 700-800 meters. 
Even though the beach, which consists of mud, is packed with sharp pieces from the vessels most 
workers perform their work barefooted. Acoording to the NorWatch representatives the workers 
do not have helmets, glows or any other type of basic protection. Furthermore the workers do not 
have any kind of protection against dangerous fumes steaming from fires where useless ship 
liquids are destroyed.  
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According to the NorWatch report all vessels bought by Chittagong scrap yard are checked for 
explosives before dismantling is started. However, explosions frequently occur, causing injuries 
and sometimes death. 
 
The Local Environment 
 
Since the dismantling process in Bangladesh and most other developing countries takes place at 
the beach, toxic wastes are dumped directly into the sea or burned at the beach. According to a 
CODEC representative interviewed by NorWatch, the Bangladeshi government has decided to 
put all their efforts into the establishment of a successful ship scrapping industry. Everything 
else, including the environment, is subordinate to this goal. All materials impossible to sell are 
thus either burned, causing fumes harmful to the local environment, or dumped at sea, causing 
destructive effects on the local marine environment and the possibilities for fruitful fisheries. 
 
Living Conditions 
 
The workers in the Bangladeshi ship scrapping yards in Chittagong live in ‘dormitories’ with 20-
30 people in each room of 25 square meters. The rent for the primitive residence is subtracted 
from the worker’s wage each month. Most workers accept the living conditions because they 
have no other job opportunities (www.norwatch.no). 
 
Implications for the Local Settlements 
 
The ship scrapping industry in Chittagong has occupied kilometres of coastline, and has forced a 
number of local villages to move (www.norwatch.no). Without access to the sea the villages, 
which are totally dependent on fishing, will loose their basis for existence. Furthermore the fish 
has disappeared near the coast and the catching has decreased since the ship scrapping industry 
was established in the 1980s. 
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A European Scrapping Initiative 
 
The EEC recently concluded in a feasibility study that due to high labour costs and the lack of 
demand for second hand steel, ship scrapping is unlikely to take place in Europe (ILO 2004a). 
However, funding for a ‘zero pollution’ ship-scrapping yard in the Netherlands has been 
obtained in 2005. The intention behind the establishment of this yard is to offer environment 
friendly, secure and healthy, in terms of working conditions, dismantling possibilities for dry-
cargo vessels, tankers and oilrigs. If the project is successful it will be replicated, and the 
company behind the idea hopes to establish as many as 30-40 similar yards. The time frame of 
the project is not yet known (www.ecodock.info). 
 
                             
Picture 3: The Netherlands:    Picture 4: The Netherlands: Asbestos 
Scrapping a ship in dry dock prevents   removal from a ship using protective gear. 
pollution of ground and surface water with oil.  (www.greenpeace.org) 
(www.greenpeace.org) 
 
  
The prices obtained in third world countries are better on per tonnes of steel basis than in OECD 
countries, increasing the financial attractiveness of the Asian market to owners of end-of-life 
vessels. Based on the significantly higher price offered in Asia one may argue that it will be 
difficult for the planned Dutch yard to attract customers.  
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Chapter Discussion 
 
Most OECD countries and several Asian countries have ratified the Basel Convention, and the 
countries have thus agreed to work for an environment friendly management of hazardous waste. 
To comply with the regulations of the Basel Convention, it has become urgent for Asian 
countries with a high vessel scrapping market share to decide on their position regarding 
treatment and trade of hazardous materials. There are, however, many different stakeholders in 
the ship scrapping industry and the different actors tend to draw the development of an 
internationally applicable system of regulation in different directions (Arleth and Krogstrup 
2006). 
 
The current ship scrapping industry can be seen from two different angles: seen from the 
perspective of a number of Asian countries the scrapping industry constitutes with an important 
part of the steel to their growing construction industries. To gain access to steel through 
dismantling of outranged vessels is associated with significantly lower costs than steel 
originating from import and processing of iron (ILO 2004). In the eyes of the Asian countries the 
ship scrapping industry is favourable both in terms of profitability and the ability to create 
thousands of jobs. It is moreover possible to argue that the reuse of huge amounts of steel is by 
far a more environment friendly way to dispose old vessels than for instance dumping at sea. 
From the perspective of a number of NGOs the industry is viewed in a less positive light, though. 
The NGOs argue that the scrapping industry is a typical example of the downside of 
globalisation due to its effects on environment and human health. In the eyes of the NGOs the 
current ship scrapping industry clearly demonstrates an expressed need for international 
regulation. 
 
Some claim that the Asian ship breaking industry represents a sustainable developmental path, 
with the creation of jobs and the reuse of steel and other vessel components. Critics argue that 
ship scrapping represents the downside of globalisation, where industrialised countries use 
developing countries for dumping of dangerous waste, exposing inhabitants and the environment 
for short- and long-term risk (ILO 2000). 
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Research has thus far not been able to confirm short-term or long-term effects on the 
environment or human health of some types of toxic materials involved in ship scrapping 
operations. However, some of the short-term consequences on workers’ health and safety 
situation are rather simple to identify. Injuries caused by the lack of basic safety equipment and 
diseases caused by uncontrolled handling of for instance asbestos are fairly well documented. 
 
Even though long-term implications are to a lesser extent scientifically documented, they are 
frequently applied as an argument for a stricter regulative framework around the ship scrapping 
industry. In for instance the Basel Convention and the EU regulation the principles of 
precautionary and proximity are applied to ensure workers’ protection even though long-term 
implications have yet to be documented. Opposite to this precautionary position others have 
argued that the development of international, regional and national regulation should be based on 
confirmed research and knowledge about short- and long-term effects. The rationale behind this 
argumentation is that unnecessary regulation of specific activities and materials should be 
avoided to ensure free market competition.  
 
The literature about the ship scrapping industry in Asia seems to confirm an overall agreement 
among researchers about the negative effects of poor working conditions in general and the lack 
of basic safety equipment in specific. It is, however, disagreement with regards to how the 
problem is to be optimally solved. 
 
First of all there seems to be a disagreement about whether the ship scrapping process should be 
removed from Asian beaches and carried out in OECD countries instead. The main argument 
applied in favour of removing the industry from Asia is that the vast majority of the vessels 
ready for scrapping have their origin in OECD countries. The three first stages of their life cycles 
–planning, construction/production and operation/maintenance/support – have been performed in 
OECD countries, and the last stage of their life cycle, the scrapping, should therefore also be 
carried out within the boarders of an OECD country.  
 
 
 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
 55 
 
The opposing view argues that the existence of the scrapping industry in Asian countries 
contributes to the creation of thousands of jobs in areas with high levels of unemployment. 
According to the supporters of this view the scrapping industry should remain in Asia, but under 
tighter regulation. Furthermore most vessels operate on a worldwide level, transporting goods 
between OECD countries, but also between OECD countries and non-OECD countries and 
between non-OECD countries. It would thus be wrong to claim that the only stage of a vessel’s 
life that is carried out in a non-OECD country is the final, scrapping stage.  
 
The information presented in this chapter confirms that the ship scrapping industry poses a 
complex situation because it involves a number of different stakeholders, it imposes problematic 
impacts on the local environment and on human health and it contributes to an important job-
creating effect.  
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CHAPTER 7 - THE CURRENT LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
During the three first phases of a vessel’s life cycle, that is planning, construction/production and 
operation/maintenance/support, a relatively well established regulative regime governing 
international shipping addresses issues related to health, safety and environment and identifies 
minimum standards. This maritime legislative framework does not, however, apply to the final 
phase of a vessel’s life cycle, that is its retirement; the scrapping of the ship. International 
standards for the scrapping process are currently limited and complex. The information provided 
in this chapter builds on the report ‘Ship scrapping- a floating scenario’ developed at the 
Roskilde University in 2006 (Arleth and Krogstrup 2006). This report investigates the need for 
new regulation in the ship scrapping industry, but does not consider economic or ethical aspects 
of the industry. Theoretically this chapter is supported by theories from the field of international 
law, described in chapter 4.  
 
Introduction to the Legislative Framework 
 
It is important to note that the future development of the regulative framework for ship scrapping 
will have immense importance to the future scrapping industry situation. Today more than 90 per 
cent of all vessels are scrapped using the beaching method, and as long as political resolutions or 
new regulations do not put restrictions on beaching as method for scrapping, the expected future 
increase in scrapping volume is not likely be met with capacity constraints. If, however, political 
resolutions concerning the environment or the health and safety situation of workers in the 
scrapping industry are introduced, a number of scrapping sites applying the beaching method 
may be forced to shut down, limiting available scrapping capacity.   
 
In this part of the report the international, regional and national regulation of the ship scrapping 
industry will be presented and discussed. The presentation of the legislative framework will be 
divided into three subcategories; environmental regimes, legislation regulating working 
conditions and regimes controlling international trade. This presentation will perhaps uncover the 
lack of, and need for, an international organ that is able to regulate the sector as a whole, 
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ensuring minimum environmental standards and basic workers’ rights throughout the world. In 
the end of the chapter important issues related to the current situation will be discussed.  
 
Environmental Regimes 
 
At the international level the ship scrapping industry is regulated by the Basel Convention on 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and by regulations adopted by the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO). Regionally regulations such as the EEC regulation on shipment of 
waste from the EU are of relevance. At the lowest level of regulation, the national level, the 
environmental regulation of the costal state is important. The difference in national 
environmental regulation between developed and developing countries must be seen as an 
important determinant for the distribution of market shares in the ship-scrapping sector. 
Typically countries with a low degree of national environmental regulation such as India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, have high market shares in ship scrapping.  
 
The International Level 
 
The Basel Convention from 1989 and the Ban Amendment from 1995 
 
The Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste from 1989 came as a 
response to a series of incidents involving dumping of hazardous waste originating in developed 
countries in developing countries in Africa and Asia. The Convention was initially aimed at 
setting up a framework for control of the transboundary movements of hazardous waste. 
Furthermore it developed the criteria for environmentally sound management and a control 
system based on prior written notification (www.basel.int (1)). The Convention has during the 
present decade expanded its aim to the minimisation of hazardous waste generation. Through 
active promotion and use of cleaner production technologies, further reduction of the movement 
of hazardous wastes, the prevention and monitoring of illegal traffic, improvement of 
institutional and technical capabilities in developing countries and further development of 
regional centres for training and transfer, the Convention aims at reducing the quantity and 
hazardousness of the wastes (Ibid).  
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The Basel Convention is at present signed by 166 countries, among these Norway and India. The 
Convention is based on several basic principles; first the Convention rests on the Precautionary 
Principle due to the imperfect knowledge and uncertainty about long-term effects of import and 
export of hazardous waste. Secondly the Polluter Pays Principle is included to ensure that the 
generator of pollution has to pay for the environmentally sound disposal of it. Lastly the 
Convention rests on the Proximity Principle to ensure that the disposal of hazardous waste takes 
place as close as possible to its point of generation (OECD 1998).  
 
The process of dismantling vessels is included in the Basel Convention, and in specific an 
amendment to the Convention, the Basel Ban, which came in 1995, is of interest to the topic of 
this report. In March 1994 “Parties agreed to an immediate ban on the export from OECD to 
non-OECD countries of hazardous wastes intended for final disposal. They also agreed to ban, 
by 31 December 1997, the export of wastes intended for recovery and recycling (Decision 11/12) 
(www.basel.int (1)). 
 
Decision 11/12 was, however, not incorporated in the Convention itself, and the question as to 
whether it should be legally binding or not arose. Consequently the Ban was included in the 
Basel Convention in 1995 as an amendment (Decision III/1). In this decision the distinction 
between OECD and non-OECD countries is not applied.  
 
The main purposes of the Ban are to ensure that hazardous waste is taken care of by the 
responsible party and to protect developing countries that have traditionally been receivers of 
hazardous waste. Vessels intended for scrapping can be classified as hazardous waste and are as 
such illegal to transport from an OECD to a non-OECD country for scrapping in terms of the 
Basel Ban. The Ban Amendment has, however, yet to enter into force. It has to be ratified by 
three-fourths (62) of the parties to the Basel Convention to become internationally legally 
binding. Currently it is ratified by 61 parties (www.basel.int (3)). 
 
The ship scrapping industry represents a challenge for the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban. 
Several of the substances included on the Basel list of hazardous waste are typically found in 20-
30 year old vessels ready for dismantling. However, to which extent the Basel Convention is 
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applicable to the ship scrapping industry is rather unclear. Some stakeholders, like for instance 
the ILO, find that the Basel Convention is difficult to implement in the scrapping industry 
because it was not developed for this sector in specific (Andersen 2001). According to an NGO 
like Greenpeace the Basel Convention is the right forum for regulation of the ship scrapping 
industry, however, the Convention has to be adapted to the specific characteristics of the industry 
in order to be effective. 
 
Representatives from the shipping industry argue, on the other hand, that end-of-life vessels 
cannot be seen as waste. According to these stakeholders the vessels are products that may be 
utilized by the receiver and do therefore not fall under the specifications of the Basel 
Convention.  
 
There seems to be a general disagreement among different stakeholders when it comes to where 
the development of ship scrapping regulation should take place. Some, like Greenpeace argue 
that the Basel Convention is a suitable framework while others tend to rely on the expertise of 
the IMO. If the IMO should be accepted by the NGOs as the most appropriate organ for ship 
scrapping regulation development, Greenpeace argue that it is important that the Basel 
Convention is respected and that the standards that are developed do not secure lower level of 
environmental protection than those of the Basel Convention. 
 
The International Maritime Organisation 
 
As indicated above the IMO seems to stand out as the most likely framework for the future 
development of regulation of the ship scrapping industry. However, to ensure that the interests of 
all stakeholders are taken care of, the IMO participates in a joint working group with ILO and the 
Basel Convention Secretariat. This working group is primarily aimed at developing an intra 
organisational common language to facilitate future cooperation, to avoid duplication of work 
and overlapping roles. According to the IMO (www.imo.org (1)) the three organisations believe 
that through minimisation of environmental, safety and occupational health risk related to the 
ship dismantling process, ship recycling can contribute to sustainable development. 
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At its 53rd session in July 2005 an organ under the IMO, the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC), decided that the IMO should develop, as a high priority, a new instrument 
on recycling of vessels to provided future legally binding and globally applicable ship recycling 
regulations for international shipping and recycling facilities. Further the MEPC agreed that the 
new IMO regulation should include regulations for the design, construction, operation and 
preparation of ships so as to facilitate safe and environmentally sound recycling, without 
compromising the safety and operational efficiency of ships; the operation of ship recycling 
facilities in a safe and environmentally sound manner; and the establishment of an appropriate 
enforcement mechanism for ship recycling (certification/reporting requirements). The new 
instrument should be completely implemented by 2008-2009 (www.imo.org (2)). 
 
On March 24 2006 the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, entered into force. This Convention was 
developed in the 1970s to protect the marine environment from dumping of wastes at sea. The 
adoption of the 1996 Protocol may have an indirect effect on the ship scrapping industry because 
it ensures that dumping of wastes will be prohibited, except for materials on an approved list 
(www.imo.org (3)). Even though this Convention does not mention ship scrapping in specific, it 
does imply that hazardous wastes have to be handled onshore since dumping at sea is no longer 
an option. 
 
The Regional Level 
 
To illustrate what is meant by regulation at the regional level, I have chosen to focus on the 
European Union as regional area and the regulations adopted by the European Commission. 
 
The 1993 Council Regulation (EU) No. 259/93 
 
This regulation concerns the supervision and control of shipments of waste within, into and out 
of the European Community (europa.eu.int (1)). Regulation 259/93 states that obsolete vessels 
destined for scrapping must be considered hazardous waste. Vessels that are incompletely 
emptied for cargo or contain toxic materials may thus be classified as hazardous waste. The first 
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legal recognition of a vessel as hazardous waste came in the Netherlands in 2002 when the 
highest Council of State ruled that the chemical tanker Sandrien, which was to be sent to India 
for scrapping, should be classified as toxic waste. The vessel contained asbestos, heavy metals 
and other dangerous substances. According to the NGOs (for instance Greenpeace) all vessels 
should be cleaned before they are sent for scrapping in developing countries. 
 
To circumvent the strict EU environmental legislation many vessels are registered under so-
called flags of convenience (FOC) (Arleth and Krogstrup 2006). FOCs typically have relatively 
low taxes, weak domestic regulation and little enforcement of international legislation. The 
legislative framework that applies to a specific vessel is determined by the regulation of the flag 
state, in other words the state where the ship is registered. The registration of flag state 
determines the legal framework the vessel must abide at sea. To cope with the tendency to 
choose FOCs to circumvent regional legislation the EU regulative opens up for the possibility of 
interpreting the port state as the port from which the vessel departs. Such an interpretation would 
ensure that an increased number of vessels leaving a port within the EU are subject to Regulation 
259/93. However, the regulation may still be avoided if the vessel visits a port outside the EU 
before it reaches its final destination. 
  
The National Level 
 
To illustrate the national level of regulation, I have chosen to describe the legislative framework 
of one major end-of-life-vessel exporting country, Norway, and one major end-of-life-vessel 
importing country, India. 
 
Norway 
 
The OECD country Norway has ratified both the Basel Convention and the Basel Ban, and due 
to its membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which is linked to the EU 
through the European Economic Agreement (EEA) Norway has since 01.05.95 applied the EC-
Waste shipment Regulation (259/93). Consequently Norway is obliged to abide to these 
regulations. According to the Norwegian Pollution Control Act of 1981, which has as its 
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objective ‘to protect the outdoor environment against pollution and to reduce existing pollution, 
to reduce the quantity of waste and to promote better waste management’ (odin.dep.no), owners 
of for instance vessels have the responsibility to clear up wastes or to pay for it to be cleared up 
(§ 37). Norway is thus subject to several international, regional and national environmental 
regulations. Nevertheless, situations where the regulations have been circumvented frequently 
occur and are sources of NGO protest campaigns.  
 
India 
 
India has, like Norway, ratified the Basel Convention and is thus obliged to follow its 
regulations. However, unlike Norway, India has yet to ratify the Basel Ban. According to the 
Basel Action Network (www.ban.org) the import of vessels containing hazardous substances is a 
clear violation under Indian law. In May 1997 the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the import of 
hazardous wastes as defined by the Basel Convention into India was prohibited. In addition the 
Central Pollution Control Board has, in its “Environmental Guidelines for Ship Breaking 
Industries” declared: “old vessels containing or contaminated with any of the above substances 
[lead, cadmium, PCB, asbestos] are accordingly [as per the Basel Convention] classified as 
hazardous materials. The customs authority and/or the concerned State Maritime Board should 
ensure this and issue a certificate to the effect that the vessel is free from the prohibited 
materials." 
 
Furthermore in its “Directions of the Supreme Court on Ship Breaking No. 657/95” the Supreme 
Court defined a number of relevant positions that has to be followed in India, including: 
 
1) Before a ship arrives at port, it should have proper consent from the concerned authority 
or the State Maritime Board, stating that it does not contain any hazardous waste or 
radioactive substances.  
2) The ship should be properly decontaminated by the ship owner prior to the breaking. 
3) A complete inventory of hazardous waste on board of ship should be made mandatory for 
the ship owner, and no breaking permission should be granted without such an inventory.  
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4) At the international level, India should participate in international meetings on ship 
breaking at the level of the International Maritime Organization and the Basel 
Convention’s Technical Working Group with a clear mandate for the decontamination of 
ships of their hazardous substances such as asbestos, waste oil, gas and PCBs prior to 
exports to India for breaking. Participants from both Central and State level should be 
included (www.toxicslink.org). 
 
It is difficult to achieve a comprehensive overview of the enforcement of the Indian regulative 
system for ship scrapping. Locally the Gujarat Maritime Board together with the Gujarat 
Pollution Control Board (gpcb.org.in) is supposed to control the ship breaking activities in 
Alang, the world’s busiest ship breaking site. At the national level offices under the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF) are responsible for the enforcement. However, according to 
The Indian Express (May 20 2005) enforcement of the regulations is poor.  
 
Regulation of Workers’ Rights 
 
In the following workers’ rights in terms of health and safety are presented on the international 
and the national level. I have chosen to focus on the situation in India because India has the 
largest market share in the ship breaking industry (see table 3). 
 
 
Table 3: Market shares as of 1999 (www.ilo.org) 
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
 
The International Labour Organization is a UN specialized agency which seeks the promotion of 
social justice and internationally recognized human and labour rights. The ILO has as its 
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objective to formulate international labour standards in the form of Conventions and 
Recommendations setting minimum standards of basic labour rights: freedom of association, the 
right to organize, collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour, equality of opportunity and 
treatment, and other standards regulating conditions across the entire spectrum of work related 
issues(www.ilo.org). 
 
The ILO is engaged in the ship scrapping industry through several arenas. The organisation has 
for instance developed health and safety guidelines and a best practice compendium especially 
intended for Asia. Furthermore the ILO publishes updated papers on specific industry issues and 
it conducts assessments on industry matters. Finally the ILO is engaged in awareness activities 
and has produced a documentary video on occupational and health issues in ship scrapping (ILO 
2001).  
 
In the paper ‘Safety and health in ship breaking: Guidelines for Asian countries and Turkey’ 
(ILO 2003) the ILO outlines basic workers’ rights in the ship breaking industry. In this paper the 
legal framework is outlined, general preventive and protective measures are described and 
possible measures against physical and biological hazards are suggested. Furthermore safety 
requirements for machines and tools, competence and training, ideal management of hazardous 
substances and several other health and safety related issues are described (ILO 2003). 
 
In debates about ship breaking the guidelines of the ILO are continuously referred to, and the 
ILO may have an influence on the future development of the international regulation on workers’ 
rights through its membership in the joint working group with the Basel group and the IMO. 
 
The Indian Legislation 
 
In India occupational safety and health (OSH) regulation, national health policy, and recent draft 
policy leaves a lot to be desired. The decline in the density of Trade Unions and rise of 
hazardous industries underlines the fact that the progress of OSH has been stalled ever since 
economic reform. The well-being of workers may deteriorate further if poor enforcement and 
widespread ignorance of OSH persist (mumbai.indymedia.org). 
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In 1998 the Gujarat High Court issued directives to improve working conditions, provide clean 
water, sanitation and health facilities to the workers. In 1999 India’s central Pollution Control 
Board issued guidelines for ship scrapping operations that included safety and environmental 
measures (The Indian Express 24 June 2003). 
 
In 2003 the Indian Supreme Court provided detailed guidelines for regulating the entry of ships 
for breaking and for ensuring that the rights of workers, costal ecology and provisions of the 
Basel Convention are not violated by the activity. To monitor the implementation of these 
directions, among several others, the Court set up a Monitoring Committee. This Committee was 
subject of complaints in January 2005 due to the possible movement of the French end-of-life 
vessel “Le Clemenceau” to Alang for demolition. The complaints indicated that the ship may 
contain unexpected levels of the health threatening substance asbestos. The Monitoring 
Committee decided that the vessel was not allowed to enter Indian waters if it contained 
asbestos. 
 
There seems to be differences among the Asian countries engaged in the ship breaking industry 
when it comes to requirements on wastes. Different from for instance Pakistan and Bangladesh 
India demands a ‘gas-free’ certificate (Stuer-Lauridsen 2003). According to the ILO all ship 
scrapping countries have introduced gas-free certificates, but the degree to which the use of these 
certificates is enforced varies between countries.  
 
In general the Indian regulation of workers’ rights in the ship breaking industry seems, relative to 
OECD countries, to be underdeveloped. Legislation is developed on an ex ante case-to-case basis 
rather than due to precautionary concerns. The high rate of injuries is harmful to productivity, 
and increased guard on safety and health would most likely be beneficial to the industry. 
According to the Indian independent media centre labour standards must be re-evaluated and 
responsible legislation has to be developed (mumbai.indymedia.org).  
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Picture 5: Ship dismantling in Alang, India.  
Source: Environmental Health Perspectives 
 
Trade Regimes 
 
Regulation of international trade has a significant effect on trade with obsolete vessels and the 
ship scrapping industry in general (Arleth and Krogstrup 2006). Most vessels are subject to 
national, regional and international regulation on trade since trade with end-of life vessels 
typically occur internationally. The legislation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
trade organisation of the maritime industry, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), is thus 
of relevance and will be briefly presented below. 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is the only global international organisation treating rules 
of trade between nations. The WTO is centred on the WTO agreements, which are signed and 
ratified by most of the world’s trading nations. The WTO is aimed at helping producers of goods 
and services, importers and exporters to conduct business. (www.wto.org (1)). The agreements 
are the result of negotiations between member countries. The current set of agreements is the 
outcome of the 1986-94 Uruguay Round negotiations that included a major revision of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (www.wto.org (2)).  
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In addition to agreements on tariffs and trade, the WTO control international trade through 
technical trade barriers, patents, import limitations etc (Friis Bach and Nordbo 1999). These 
agreements have a significant impact on national regulation on for instance environment and 
health. Environmental regulation is of WTO interest because it may contribute to restriction on 
the free movement of trade. In relation to other agreements concerning the environment, health, 
safety and trade, such as the Basel Convention, article XX developed by the WTO is of 
relevance. This article poses exceptions to the GATT agreement and states that:  
 
‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health or relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption’ (www.wto.org (3)). 
 
Due to this exception paragraph countries are, under certain conditions, allowed to introduce 
trade-restricting measures, such as import bans. In the ship scrapping industry this exception to 
the GATT is important. Under article XX countries may for instance reject to import end-of-life 
vessels that contain toxic substances that may be harmful to the environment and/or human and 
animal health. Whether trade with obsolete vessels is covered by the exception paragraph has, 
however, long been a matter of discussion.  
 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) 
 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is the international trade association for merchant 
ship operators. The ICS represents the collective views of the international industry from 
different nations, sectors and trades (www.marisec.org (1)). Representing the interests of the 
shipping industry, including shipping companies, the ICS has been accused by NGOs for using 
its influence in the IMO to ensure a development towards an international regulation of the ship 
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scrapping industry that is less rigid than the Basel Convention. The ICS claims that the Basel 
Convention does not cover the movement of ships to recycling yards. Furthermore the ICS states 
that ‘placing responsibility for the conditions in the yards themselves directly upon ship owners 
is neither reasonable nor practical’ (www.marisec.org (2)). 
 
Chapter Discussion 
 
As the final deadline for the phase out of single hulled tankers approaches, scrapping volume 
increases, and the need for a worldwide legislative framework for performing business within the 
ship scrapping industry becomes more evident than ever before. The description of 
environmental-, workers’ rights- and trade regulation illustrates that the current international 
legislative framework surrounding the ship scrapping industry in terms of working conditions 
and environmental conditions on scrapping locations is complex and incomplete.  
 
Several factors contribute to the complexity of the industrial situation. First of all the global 
dimension of the industry, which ensures that international, regional and national legislation has 
to be taken into account, is a factor that increases the level of complexity (Arleth and Krogstrup 
2006). The fact that regulation on several levels as well as on several areas may be applicable to 
the ship scrapping industry has frequently lead to uncertainty about which regulation should be 
applied in any specific case and about which regulative framework has precedence over the 
other. 
 
Environmentalists tend to argue that in the long term environmental regulation must have 
precedence over trade regulation to ensure sustainable development. However, stakeholders in 
developed countries fear that if environmental legislation is allowed to outrange trade legislation 
the result will be protectionism and restrictions on free trade because countries will apply 
national environmental legislation to keep domestically produced products and services away 
from international competition (Friis Bach and Nordbo 1999). 
 
Furthermore the high number of industry stakeholders and their differing individual 
understanding of the applicability of existing environmental, health and safety and trade regimes 
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to the ship scrapping industry is another factor increasing complexity. Some stakeholders, in 
specific NGOs fighting for the environment and human rights, attempt to pressure the 
international society to specify the international regulation to the ship scrapping industry. Other 
stakeholders, like the shipping industry and some developed countries, are fighting against a 
development towards stricter regulation because regulation as such will worsen industry trade 
conditions.  
 
As an example the Basel Convention, which is an environment protecting convention with trade 
restricting elements that may be applicable to the ship-scrapping sector, is often circumvented 
because different stakeholders disagree about the definition of obsolete vessels. By the 
stakeholders in favour of applying the Basel Convention to ship scrapping, end-of-life vessels are 
defined as waste, and thus covered by the Convention. Stakeholders like the ICS disagree to this 
definition, define end-of-life vessels as products and argue that the trade with these vessels is not 
covered by the Basel Convention. 
 
Even though a number of the components in an obsolete vessel is on the Basel Ban list of 
hazardous substances, different stakeholders disagree about whether the vessel as a whole can be 
defined as waste and is subject to the Basel Convention, or if only the parts of the vessel 
containing the hazardous components fall under the definition of waste. Due to this high degree 
of definition uncertainty the shipping industry has thus far been able to circumvent the Basel 
Convention by defining the vessels as products and referring to the WTO agreements about free 
trade in products. 
 
The joint Basel/IMO/ILO working group has recently been established to develop an 
internationally applicable regulative framework for the ship scrapping industry. Initially the 
group has been aimed at undertaking a comprehensive examination of the guidelines developed 
by each of the three organisations to uncover gaps, overlapping agendas or ambiguity 
(www.imo.org (1)). This joint group has, however, solely an advisory purpose and no legislative 
competence. The establishment of the group must be seen as an attempt to develop a common 
language and respect between the regimes. 
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The global dimension of the ship scrapping industry, the high number of stakeholders and the 
uncertainty about regulation interpretation are all factors contributing to the complexity of the 
industrial situation. As the deadline for phase out of single hulled tankers is approaching and the 
volume of obsolete vessels is expected to increase, the need for negotiation between different 
stakeholders and to establish a responsible organ able to define a clear industry framework is 
becoming more evident than ever before. If an independent organ is to be able to develop such a 
framework it is important that all stakeholders are willing to cooperate and realise their value 
chain responsibility. The degree to which the shipping industry seems to be willing to realise 
value chain responsibility will be discussed later in this report.  
 
It is important to remember that if new environmental or working condition related regulation is 
introduced, some of the currently operating scrap yards may not be able to comply with the 
requirements and will thus be pushed out of business. The result may then be scrapping capacity 
constraints, and loss of a number of workplaces with its many spreading consequences. The 
designers of the new regulation have to take this implication into account and perhaps suggest 
possible solutions that will enable scrap yards to meet the new requirements.  
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CHAPTER 8- VALUE CHAIN RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SHIPPING 
INDUSTRY 
 
Does a shipping company have responsibility for the conditions under which its vessels are 
dismantled even though this work is carried out by another, independent company? In this part of 
the report the downstream value chain responsibility (VCR) of a shipping company will be 
discussed. Legal regulation and level of moral maturity together with distribution of power 
among players in the industry are factors that are likely to affect the shipping company’s degree 
and understanding of responsibility. Theoretically this chapter builds on theories derived from 
the field of business ethics. 
 
The term ‘value chain responsibility’ is relatively new, and has its origin in the development of 
the so-called network organisation (Phillips and Caldwell 2005). Through the evolution of the 
network organisation during the last 30-40 years, where several independent companies 
cooperates in the value creating process, the boundaries of the firm have become more difficult 
to define. Which stakeholders are internal and which are external to the organization is becoming 
an increasingly complicated question to answer. The networked organisation has characteristics 
that may provide it with huge amounts of power. Lagging in the wake of the increase in 
international power, has been the development of new concepts of responsibility within networks 
or value chains. With blurry organisational boundaries responsibility has become more difficult 
to attribute. 
 
The Value Chain of a Vessel 
 
The shipping industry is a service industry where value is created through the generation of 
services demanded by customers. The downstream customers are companies producing goods at 
one location and selling goods at another location, thus demanding transport between the 
locations. The shipping industry does, however, have an additional value chain, the value chain 
of its mean of transport, the vessel. The vessel is typically ordered from a shipyard, then operated 
by one shipping company, sold and resold to other companies, and then, finally, sold to a scrap 
yard. This life cycle is typically of about 20-30 years, and when the vessel is sold to the scrap 
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yard, its remaining value lies in the value of its steel components and other reusable items. The 
latter of these two value chains is in focus in this report.   
 
The value chain of a vessel is special in a number of ways. Most discussions about the value 
chain responsibilities of multinational giants concern the companies that are sourcing in 
developing countries, in other words, discussions about upstream responsibility. Shipping 
companies sell their outranged vessels to developing countries, and the value chain responsibility 
has thus a downstream, customer focused, dimension. 
 
The literature suggests that ‘the value chain is a series of interconnected firms engaged in 
bringing value to a good or service as the good or service makes its way to end users’ (Phillips 
and Caldwell 2005, p.1). Unlike the typical good or service, vessels have not been produced with 
the demands of the end customer, the scrap yard, in mind. The needs of an intermediary 
customer, the shipping company, have been in focus during the production of the vessel. Today 
NGOs argue that the interests of the end customer have to be taken into consideration during the 
production of the vessel. The NGOs argue that materials that can be a threat to workers’ health or 
the local environment during dismantling should not be applied during construction.  
 
Furthermore environmentalists have demanded that the shipping company should empty all 
vessels sold for scrapping for hazardous components before the dismantling process takes place, 
again taking the interests of the local community into account. If the requirements of 
environmentalists are to be followed by shipping companies, a vessel might end up with a 
negative cash flow at the end of its value chain. If such a situation arises the ship owner may not 
be willing to pay for the dismantling of the company’s vessel. As mentioned earlier (see chapter 
5) the result will be a ghost fleet of old, non-operating vessels. 
 
 
Katrine Vetaas Vedeler, May 2006 
 73 
Distribution of Power 
 
Until the 1970s North American and European obsolete vessels were mainly dismantled in North 
American and European dry docks (see chapter 5). The shipping companies as well as the scrap 
yards were independent market players responsible for their actions and subject to European or 
North American legal regulation. The two parties were considered to be equally powerful and 
able to affect environmental and working conditions. As the advantages of selling outranged 
vessels to Asian developing countries applying the so called beaching method of ship 
dismantling started to be utilised in the 1980s, the terms of the industry started to change. The 
distribution of power between the shipping companies and the scrap yards became uneven, in 
favour of the shipping companies.  
 
The literature on value chain responsibility suggests that when the distribution of power becomes 
uneven between value chain members, the most powerful member of the chain is often held 
responsible for the actions of less powerful upstream or downstream members of the chain 
(Phillips 2003). According to the traditional understanding, the various nodes of a value chain 
are independent of one another. Producers of raw materials, distributors, retailers, and final 
consumers are independent entities with no relationship between one another beyond the 
economic transaction by which the goods or services exchange hands. 
 
The understanding of value chains and value chain responsibility seems to be changing, though. 
Several of the shipping industry stakeholders, like the buyers of shipping services, NGOs, 
including environmental and societal organisations, and the general public have developed new 
conventions (see chapter 4) and no longer accept the premise that the shipping company is an 
island or that it is incapable of influencing its value chain. As the business activity of shipping 
companies has become more extended and networked, stakeholders’ expectations of 
responsibility have accelerated and it is likely that the shipping companies will have to shoulder 
even more responsibility for externalities caused by value chain activity in the future (Slater 
2004).  
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Challenges to Embracing Value Chain Responsibility 
 
The most common way to state good intentions about value chain responsibility is through social 
responsibility reports, outsourcing reports, codes of conduct, and the like. In statements like 
these the company describes its efforts to establish acceptable practices in its value chain. The 
incentive to develop the reports is often prior problems or requests from NGOs or activists to do 
more to protect health, security and environment.  
 
The reports are often criticised for lack of accuracy, for instance that the companies that issue the 
report present themselves in an undeservedly favourable light or fail to present VCR issues 
correctly. Companies that have reached the highest level of moral reasoning, the post-
conventional level, described by Kohlberg (see chapter 4) may be genuinely interested in 
accepting greater responsibility for value chain activity, transparency and accuracy about their 
activities and the activities performed by their value chain partners may carry dangers. If 
transparency is not industry standard, one company’s openness about value chain difficulties 
may lead to a competitive disadvantage on the short term, since the company that performs 
monitoring and displays problems may appear to have greater problems than competitors that do 
not monitor at all. It may thus be competitively harmful to be among the first to embrace greater 
VCR and transparency when others continue to reap the economic benefits of refusing to accept 
responsibility (Phillips and Caldwell 2005). 
 
The response to such short-term challenges is typically the establishment of some sort of 
governing or enforcement body that can apply legal measures to achieve the desired effect on a 
local, national or international level of legislation. Legal sanctions may for instance be effective 
in case of false social responsibility advertisement or accusations of human rights violations in 
foreign countries.   
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Chapter Conclusion 
 
The shipping company is often the dominant player in the value chain of a vessel. Based on the 
current view on value chain responsibility, and due to the shipping company’s position of power 
it is likely to be held responsible, not only for the conditions under which its own employees 
work or the pollution the shipping company causes, but also for the conditions under which the 
employees of its subcontractors works and the pollution their operations cause. It is thus 
plausible that the shipping companies to an increasing extent will be held responsible for poor 
working conditions and environmentally hazardous operations at the locations where their 
vessels are scrapped by less powerful value chain members. 
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CHAPTER 9 - BERGESEN WORLDWIDE ASA – AN EXAMPLE 
 
Thus far in the report I have focused on three areas affecting the ship scrapping industry in 
general; the economies of ship scrapping (see chapter 5), the current legislative landscape (see 
chapter 7) and the business ethics of shipping companies (see chapter 8). The theoretical 
foundation for understanding the mechanisms of these three areas was built in chapter 4. In this 
section of the report I will try to illustrate how the three areas might affect the operations and 
decisions of one industry participant – Bergesen Worldwide Ltd. (referred to as Bergesen)- by 
diving into six demolitions owned by the company. 
 
I have chosen to focus on Bergesen because the company is a major shipping industry player, 
because it has gained significant media attention due to one of its choices of scrapping location 
and, finally, because it has been subject to Norwegian, European Union and international 
legislation. All Bergesen vessels referred to here were registered in the Norwegian International 
Ship Register (NIS) when they were scrapped. 
 
Bergesen Worldwide – The Company 
The BW Group is one of the world’s leading maritime groups. It comprises BW Gas, BW 
Tankers, BW Dry Bulk and BW Offshore. BW Gas was listed in Oslo in October 2005 as a pure 
gas shipping company with the BW group retaining a majority share. The non-gas assets remain 
in private ownership (www.bergesenworldwide.com).  
The BW group’s leading position in the maritime industry has been underpinned by the historic 
achievements of two long-standing shipping businesses: Bergesen d.y. ASA and World-Wide 
Shipping. Bergesen Worldwide (BW) Gas ASA is the world’s largest gas shipping company, 
transporting liquefied petroleum gases (propane and butane) and liquefied natural gas (LNG) all 
over the world. (www.bergesen.no).  
BW Shipping Managers, part of the BW Group, is the commercial and technical manager of the 
BW group’s tanker fleet. With a fleet of 23 VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) it is one of the 
world’s leading operators of super tankers. BW Shipping Managers is also the technical manager 
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of 6 dry bulk vessels, part of the 12 dry bulk vessels commercially managed by BW 
(www.bwshipping.com).  
Bergesen Worldwide Owned Demolitions 
Since May 2003 Bergesen has scrapped the six vessels listed in the table below:  
Type Name Size (DWT) Built Date Ldt US$/Ldt Location 
L.P.G. Havprins 40,605 1974 26.03.2004 16,48 365.00 China 
L.P.G. Havmann 40,625 1973 12.01.2004 16,427 325.00 China 
L.P.G. Hesperus 40,615 1973 08.08.2003 16,5 245.50 India 
L.P.G. Havsol 9,521 1976 16.05.2003 5,783 200.00 China 
Tanker Berge Borg 315,699 1976 09.05.2003 41,7 197.50 China 
Tanker Berge Boss 315,699 1976 09.05.2003 41,7 197.50 China 
 
Table 4: Bergesen owned demolitions 
Source: Clarkson Research Studies (2006) 
 
 
The table reveals that Bergesen has not sold any vessels for scrap since March 2004. 
Consequently the cases discussed in this report will be somewhat old, and may not fully reflect 
Bergesen’s current understanding of for instance value chain responsibility. In the section below 
each of the six cases will be briefly described.  
 
Berge Boss and Berge Borg  
 
Berge Boss and Berge Borg, two ULCCs, were put through their fifth special surveys in 2001. 
Both vessels had been trading profitably in the half year before they were sold to Chinese scrap 
yards, not least carrying cargoes out of Iraq. When the Iraq war broke out, the vessels were taken 
out of service. The decision to scrap the vessels was, however, taken in 2002 due to a lack of 
approval from the oil majors of the vessels (Platts Commodity News May 2003).  
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Havsol 
 
The sale of the gas carrier Havsol for scrap was planned in July 2002 and carried out in May 
2003. Bergesen reported that the sale contributed with an insignificant sales profit. Havsol was 
number eight in a group of small 1970s-built gas carriers cleared out during 2002-2003. During 
the following year more gas carriers with similar characteristics were to be sold for scrap. 
According to Loyd’s List (May 2003) brokers did not find the sale surprising, as Bergesen was 
known to be heading towards selling or demolishing old tonnage to partially finance the 
construction of new and larger gas carriers. 
 
Hesperus 
 
In the beginning of August 2003 brokers suggested that Hesperus, a1973 built lpg carrier, were 
to be sold to Chinese breakers. According to Trade Winds (August 2003) Hesperus was likely to 
fetch some $240 per ldt if it was sold to Indian breakers or some $220 per ldt if it was sold to 
China. Bergesen ended up selling Hesperus to India for $245.50 per ldt, even though the 
company considered Chinese scrap yards to be more environmentally friendly (Trade Winds 
August 2003). 
Before it was allowed beaching in Alang, India, Indian custom authorities arrested Hesperus. 
According to the environmental organisation Greenpeace the vessel was arrested due to 
suspicions about substances like PCB and asbestos aboard Hesperus (Dagsavisen October 2003). 
According to the Basel Convention (see chapter 7) transport of hazardous waste to developing 
countries is illegal. Bergesen director Jens Ismar rejected the accusations and claimed that 
Hesperus had a gas-free certificate, that the vessel did not contain any hazardous substances and 
that it was cleaned in accordance with international standards prior to the sale (Reuters 
September 2003). Ismar explained the arrest by a price dispute between Bergesen and the Indian 
buyer.  
Indian custom authorities released Hesperus in late September and Greenpeace followed up by 
demanding a list of all substances aboard Hesperus, which is a requirement under Indian national 
law. This time the Indian Environment Ministry categorically instructed the port authorities at 
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Alang not to allow the ship to beach, based on the Basel Convention. India then became the 
second country after Turkey to seize a vessel on the grounds of violating the Basel Convention.  
The list of components aboard Hesperus revealed that the ship contained some two kilograms of 
quick silver, but no traces of either PCB or asbestos (Dagsavisen October 2003). Bergesen 
promised that it would take care of the quick silver in a responsible manner, and Hesperus was, 
in the beginning of October 2003, allowed beaching in India. In the aftermath of Hesperus, 
Bergesen lawyer Arne Falkanger Thorsen said that Chinese breakers would be a preferred choice 
for future Bergesen owned demolitions (Dagens Næringsliv October 2003). 
The Hesperus case induced India’s Supreme Court to formulate fresh guidelines for ship 
breaking. The Court decreed that, as per the recommendations of the committee, an inter-
ministerial panel comprising the ministries of surface transport, labour and environment should 
be constituted. The inter-ministerial panel were to act in conjunction with the involvement of 
labour and environmental organisations, as well as representatives of the ship breaking industry 
and it were to monitor all ship breaking activities in the country (Loyd’s List October 2003). 
 
Havmann 
 
In June 2001 Bergesen decided that the 1973 built gas carrier Havmann was going into dry dock 
in Greece to be kept in service another five years (LPG World June 2001). Havmann was, 
however, sold to Chinese breakers in January 2004 at what was then a record high price for gas 
carriers of $325 per ldt. The ship had been fixed for a voyage to the Far East, which meant it 
would be open in South Korea. This made scrapping in China an even more attractive 
alternative. Bergesen’s director Jens Ismar claimed that the company was not speeding up its 
phase-out of old LPG carriers, despite high scrap prices (Trade Winds January 2004). 
 
Havprins 
 
In March 2004 Bergesen went into negotiations to sell the 53,000-cbm Havprins (built 1974) for 
demolition. According to Jens Ismar it is company policy to sell vessels for scrap when they 
reach the age of 30 years. Ismar said to Trade Winds that Bergesen has no other tonnage similar 
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to Havprins that has reached the company’s scrapping age (Trade Winds March 2004). Havprins 
was sold to Chinese breakers in March 2004 and since then no other Bergesen vessels have been 
dismantled. 
 
Analysis of the Cases 
 
The above description of the six cases indicates that, except for Hesperus, none of the Bergesen 
owned demolitions have evoked much media attention. It is, however, based on the information 
referred to above, possible to learn something about how the economies of ship breaking, 
international law and business ethics have affected Bergesen’s decisions by analysing the six 
cases. The objective of the final section of this chapter is to perform such an analysis. 
 
How have the Economies of Ship Scrapping Affected Bergesen? 
 
By looking at the general development of Bergesen owned demolitions during the last five years 
it becomes apparent that the company is no exception from business cycle influence, as the 
business cycle of the shipping industry clearly affects Bergesen’s decisions and operations. 
While freight rates were modest and scrap prices were correspondingly low, Bergesen followed 
the industry trend, and sold 20 vessels for scrap to Asian breakers in the period from 2002 to 
2004. As freight rates increased and the industry as a whole scrapped less vessels (see chapter 5), 
Bergesen followed up and sold fewer vessels for scrap. With record high freight rates from April 
2004 to April 2006 no Bergesen vessels have been scrapped, again illustrating a textbook 
example of the negative correlation between freight rate and volume of scrapping (see chapter 4). 
 
Supply Side Drivers 
 
The company policy of Bergesen is, as mentioned above, to sell its vessels for scrap when they 
reach the age of 30 years (Trade Winds March 2004). Nevertheless, Berge Boss, Berge Borg and 
Havsol, all built in 1976, were sold to breakers in 2003, at the age of 27 years. When these three 
fairly old vessels were sold in May 2003 the freight rate had yet to sky rocket, and Bergesen, like 
many other ship owners, concluded that the obtainable scrap price available in the market at that 
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point in time outweighed the difference between expected future incomes and expected future 
running costs for the vessels.  
 
In the case of Berge Borg and Berge Boss, both single hull tankers, Bergesen may also have had 
the phase out regulation of the IMO (Regulation 13G with amendments) in mind when deciding 
to scrap the old tankers. In addition to the high age of the four gas carriers, the desire to clear out 
old, smaller vessels and invest in new and larger vessels might have affected the supply of 
Bergesen vessels to the scrapping industry.  
 
Demand Side Drivers  
 
Five of the six Bergesen vessels described above were scrapped in China, exemplifying China’s 
strong demand for second hand steel. Even though Chinese breakers have paid record high scrap 
prices in some cases, like for instance in the case of Havmann, the average price obtainable in 
China is somewhat lower than in India and Bangladesh (Clarkson Research Studies 2006). When 
Hesperus was sold for scrap Bangladeshi breakers had formed a cartel fixing the scrap price 
(Lloyd’s List October 2003). This cartel might have been the reason why a Bangladeshi scrap 
yard was not chosen. Hesperus was sold to Indian breakers because the Indian company was able 
to offer a higher scrap price than its Chinese counterpart (Trade Winds August 2003). The higher 
price offered in India is probably connected to a lower level of labour costs and capital costs and 
less environmental requirements in India than in China.  
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Future Prognoses 
 
How are the economies of ship scrapping likely to affect Bergesen in the future? The future 
effect of business cycles and regulation on Bergesen is likely to depend on the age distribution of 
Bergesen’s current fleet. 
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Figure 12: Bergesen fleet age profile  
Source: www.bergesenworldwide.com (2) (2006) 
 
The graph above illustrates the age profile of Bergesen Worldwide’s fleet of vessels as of April 
2006. The fleet consists of dry bulk and gas carriers in addition to tankers owned by the 
Bergesen Worldwide Group. For the years 2007 to 2009 the graph illustrates number of vessels 
on order. In total the fleet consists of 128 vessels, including 85 gas carriers, 12 bulk carriers and 
31 tankers, eight with single skin. 23.4 % of the total fleet is above 25 years of age. The average 
age of the fleet is 13.6 years.  
 
According to Bergesen’s director, Jens Ismar, the company policy is to sell old vessels for scrap 
when they reach the age of 30 years (Trade Winds March 2004). This should imply that the three 
vessels built in 1973 and 1974 were due for demolition in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Bergesen 
may have chosen to keep the vessels in operation due to high demand for the services offered by 
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the vessels. Furthermore the graph illustrates that Bergesen possesses one vessel built in 1975 
and three vessels built in 1976, two vessels built in 1977 and seven vessels built in 1978. If 
Bergesen sticks to its company policy four vessels should be sold for demolition in 2006 and two 
and seven vessels are expected to be scrapped in 2007 and 2008 respectively. By April 2006 no 
Bergesen vessels have been sold for demolition (Clarkson Database 2006). 
 
Even though it may be possible to draw some conclusions based of the age profile of Bergesen’s 
fleet, it is very difficult to give any concrete answers to how the future development of the 
shipping industry will affect Bergesen and other shipping companies. As pointed out in chapter 4 
the volume of scrapping is significantly affected by freight market rates. Currently these rates are 
exceptionally high, indicating a low total volume sold for scrap. Since Bergesen has not sold any 
vessels for scrap since March 2004 it seems reasonable to believe that Bergesen, like most 
shipping industry companies, is affected by industry business cycles. It is worth noting that 
Bergesen’s fleet has a relatively low average age (13.6 years), which may indicate that, in case of 
a drop in freight rates, Bergesen might sell their vessels for scrap later than shipping companies 
with a higher percentage of relatively old vessels. 
 
How has the Legislative Framework Affected Bergesen?   
 
The Basel Convention and the Basel Ban 
 
Bergesen has in specific experienced the influence of the Basel Convention on Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Waste (see chapter 7). This convention or environmental regime was 
for instance evoked in the case of Hesperus. Since Hesperus was registered in NIS, and both 
Norway and India have signed the Basel Convention, the vessel was subject to the regulations of 
the Convention. As mentioned above the gas carrier was arrested by Indian port authorities based 
on the Basel Convention due to suspicions about hazardous waste aboard the vessel. Bergesen 
was in addition accused for not having notified Indian authorities about the arrival of Hesperus in 
advance, which is a requirement both under the Basel Convention and under Indian national law.  
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When a complete list of inventory was published and Bergesen admitted responsibility for the 
quick silver aboard, Hesperus was allowed beaching since it was no longer expected to contain 
hazardous waste. Bergesen’s responsibility for the quick silver is formalised in the Basel Ban, 
which has been ratified by Norwegian authorities, but has yet to enter into force globally. Indian 
authorities have not ratified the Basel Ban. The Basel Convention and the Basel Ban has been 
signed and ratified, respectively, by China. This may indicate that Bergesen’s director’s 
assumption that China is a more environmentally friendly alternative is correct. 
 
As outlined in the theory chapter of this report (chapter 4), national governments have to balance 
competing goals, namely environmental and non-environmental goals (Sprinz 1992). India may 
have chosen not to sign the Basel Ban because the country fears to loose supply of obsolete 
vessels to competitors with less stringent environmental regulations. If India chose to sign the 
Basel Ban, and the Ban enters into force, the prices Indian scrap yards will be able to pay for 
outranged vessels may decline. China, which has ratified the Ban, offers lower average scrap 
prices than its main competitors, India and Bangladesh, which have yet to ratify and implement 
the Ban. India will thus have what Prittwitz (1990) described as polluter interests. In the 
framework developed by Sprinz (1992) it seems natural to place India in the group 
‘intermediates’ (see figure 6), that is countries that scores high on ecological vulnerability and 
high on abatement costs. 
 
Furthermore domestic factors may have an affect on India’s willingness to engage in the Basel 
Ban and in regimes protecting workers’ rights. First of all India cannot be said to have reached 
the level of post materialism (see chapter 4) known from Western countries, and interests groups 
protecting the environment, health and security are relatively rare. India is, however, advancing 
in the field of technology, implying that the country is developing resources that may contribute 
in improving environmental conditions, also in the ship scrapping industry. India has, however, 
yet to reach a level of wealth where it is possible to focus on environment, health and security 
rather than profit.  
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IMO Regulation 13G 
 
The IMO decision to phase out single hull vessel is another regulation at the international level 
that may affect Bergesen. The two single hull tankers Berge Borg and Berge Boss were both 
scrapped in 2003, perhaps due to a combination of high age, relatively low freight rates and the 
certainty about future phase out dates. Currently Bergesen possesses 19 tankers, the oldest is 
built in 1990, and eight of the tankers have single skin and will thus be subject to the IMO 
regulations in the future. The table below illustrates Bergesen’s 2001 expectations about the 
effect of the IMO regulations (Bergesen d.y. ASA 2001). 
 
 
Year Built Number Resulting Age 
2003 1973 or earlier 0 - 
2004 1974 and 1975 1 29 years 
2005 1976 and 1977 5 28/29 years 
2006 1978, 1979 and 1980 2 26/27 years 
2007 1981 and later 3 21/24/26 years 
 
Table 5: Future Bergesen demolitions 
Source: Bergesen d.y. ASA (2001) 
 
Even though the company did not expect to scrap any vessels in 2003 both Berge Boss and 
Berge Borg were scrapped this year, and not in 2005 which was their expected scrap year. The 
decision to scrap the two ULCCs was probably, as mentioned earlier, based on high age, poor 
freight rate and the IMO regulations. Since 2001 Bergesen has been through a substantial 
renewal (www.huginonline.com) of the tanker fleet and several of the relatively old vessels have 
been sold. The remaining vessels are expected to reach almost the same age as they would 
without the IMO regulations (Ibid.). 
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Does Bergesen Admit Value Chain Responsibility? 
 
To reveal whether Bergesen, as a representative from the shipping industry, admits value chain 
responsibility I will try to place the company at one of the stages of moral development 
described by Lawrence Kohlberg (1971) (see chapter 4). I will assume that level of moral 
maturity is likely to affect the degree to which a company admits value chain responsibility. The 
analysis is based on Bergesen’s choice of scrapping location in the six cases described in the 
beginning of this chapter, and how Bergesen handled the Hesperus case, which was subject to 
substantial media attention. At the beginning of the section I will briefly discuss why Bergesen 
should pay attention to its value chain responsibility. 
 
When reading this section it is important to keep in mind that all information about the Bergesen 
owned demolitions is second hand information, mainly derived from Norwegian and 
international newspapers. As mentioned in chapter 3 newspapers are seldom neutral in their 
descriptions and the interests of all involved stakeholders are not likely to be fully covered. 
 
Bergesen’s Stakeholders 
 
First of all it is important to note that Bergesen, like most ship owners, is a powerful link in the 
value chain of a vessel. In chapter 8 it was underlined that the most powerful member of a chain 
is often held responsible for the actions of less powerful upstream or downstream members of 
the chain (Phillips 2003). Consequently Bergesen may be held responsible for the actions of the 
Indian or Chinese scrap yards where their vessels are dismantled, even though Bergesen no 
longer owns the vessel at the time of demolition. 
 
A shipping company like Bergesen has several stakeholders to pay attention to when choosing 
path of action. All of these stakeholders are in the position to hold Bergesen responsible for the 
actions of its downstream value chain member, the scrap yard. A key word is reputation. Since 
Bergesen is an international operator, with customers all over the world, people evaluate their 
actions with different backgrounds in terms of for instance culture. The degree to which 
Bergesen admits value chain responsibility may be experienced differently in different cultures 
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based on the general level of development in each culture. Customers in developed countries 
may for instance afford to pay more attention to Bergesen’s environmental profile, while 
customers in less developed countries have to focus solely on the prices offered by Bergesen. 
 
When choosing shipping company international customers may be affected by the opinions of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Bergesen has thus to consider the requirements of 
NGOs like for instance Greenpeace because these kinds of organisations have the power to 
influence how customers experience Bergesen. In the case of for example Hesperus Greenpeace 
managed to draw substantial negative attention towards Bergesen, based on Bergesen’s choice of 
scrapping location. Negative attention like this, revealing a possible lack of value chain 
responsibility, is potentially harmful to Bergesen’s reputation, and may in turn lead to decreasing 
profits.  
 
There is a close link between the actions of the NGOs and the world press. If an NGO manages 
to reveal that a company like Bergesen is not acting in accordance with the general 
understanding of what is morally accepted behaviour, the world press is eager to cover the story. 
When Greenpeace started focusing on the Hesperus case, the world press followed up by printing 
stories with a taste of sensation. The demolition of the five other Bergesen vessels described in 
this report did on the other hand not gain any attention by NGOs, and no media attention arose. 
Less NGO attention at Chinese scrap yards may be due to better conditions in China. However, 
Greenpeace states that the conditions in China are similar to those in India 
(www.greenpeaceweb.org (2)), indicating that NGOs and their choice of attention influence the 
evaluation of the degree to which a company admits value chain responsibility. 
 
Another group of stakeholders, the shareholders, and their evaluation of Bergesen and its value 
chain partners, may be equally important to the company. Shareholders contribute with liquid 
assets and enable Bergesen to invest in for example vessels and other equipment. Negative media 
attention due to choice of for instance choice of scrapping location might ruin Bergesen’s 
reputation among shareholders, and in turn result in less willingness to invest in the company. 
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Finally negative media attention may result in a less favourable relationship between Bergesen 
and its vendors. If Bergesen’s reputation is significantly damaged, some shipyards may be 
unwilling to sell their vessels to Bergesen, due to fear of loosing credibility. It is, however, more 
likely that unfavourable media attention affects the relationship between Bergesen and its 
customers, like for instance oil companies, than the relationship between Bergesen and its 
vendors. The rationale behind this may be that it is plausible that oil companies to a larger extent 
than the shipyards are affected by a shipping company’s poor reputation. 
 
Level of Moral Maturity 
 
In the theory about the economics of ship scrapping presented in chapter 4 it is argued that 
shipping companies are highly price sensitive when choosing scrap yard. The scrap yard that is 
able to offer the highest price for any shipping company’s obsolete vessel wins the battle 
regardless of how the yard treats its workers or what it does to protect the environment. This 
reflects a rather egoistic view on ethics. The corporation has as its sole objective to maximise 
own profit without regard for the environment or the well-being of people affected by its actions 
(Falkenberg 2004). According to Kohlberg (1971) such cost-benefit calculations within the 
bounds of legality is typical for the pre-conventional level of moral reasoning. 
 
Prior to the demolition of Hesperus brokers suggested that the vessel would be sold for scrap to 
Chinese scrap yards despite lower Chinese scrap prices (Trade Winds August 2003). The brokers 
based their anticipations on statements from Bergesen about the importance of better 
environmental conditions in China than in for instance India. At the time Bergesen director Jens 
Ismar stated that ‘We try to operate responsibly with regard to the environment and China is a 
good alternative. We will not scrap in Bangladesh for the time being (Ibid).’  
 
Hesperus was, however, sold to an Indian scrap yard and, due to a focus on the vessel from 
Greenpeace; Bergesen received much negative media attention. In the aftermath of Hesperus 
Bergesen lawyer Arne Falkanger Thorsen underlined that China would be a preferred choice for 
future Bergesen scrapings (Dagens Næringsliv Morgen October 2003). The vessels sold for scrap 
since Hesperus, Havmann and Havprins were sold to China. 
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The negative media attention that arose in the wake of Hesperus illustrates what follows if a 
company does not act in accordance with what is generally accepted; the conventions of a 
particular society. Bergesen, which is a company with Norwegian roots, got particularly much 
negative attention in Norwegian newspapers (see for instance Dagsavisen September 2003, 
Adresseavisen September 2003 or Dagsavisen October 2003), indicating that the conventions of 
the Norwegian society had been broken. During the Hesperus case the institutions of the 
Norwegian society, in terms of the regulatory framework (the Basel Convention) and the norms 
and values of the people were challenged. If Bergesen stated that the company would avoid India 
and Bangladesh as scrapping locations in the future to act in accordance with Norwegian 
institutions, the company has reached what Kohlberg refers to as the conventional level of moral 
development.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 4, to adhere to local institutions does not ensure ethical behaviour. 
Information about the conditions under which a Bergesen vessel is scrapped does not always 
reach Norwegian newspapers, and the conventions of the Norwegian society may thus not be 
challenged. The actions of Bergesen will then be evaluated under for instance Indian institutions, 
which may be less developed than Norwegian institutions, both in terms of legal framework and 
in terms of norms and values. In chapter 6 it became apparent that developing country 
institutions are inadequate, unable to protect the local environment and inhabitants. If Bergesen 
adheres to Indian conventions this may not be enough to ensure ethical behaviour. 
 
In the case of Hesperus Bergesen stated that it had followed industry code of practice, which is 
the institution or system of conventions connected to the shipping industry (Lloyd’s List October 
2003). Even though Bergesen adhered to the code of practice, hazardous substances like quick 
silver was transferred to a developing country, and Hesperus was finally dismantled under poor 
environmental and working conditions at an Indian beach. This may indicate that the industry 
code of practice for ship scrapping is inadequate, unable to protect workers and the environment. 
If the industry code of practice is improved and laws regulate behaviour, norms and values it 
might be easier for Bergesen to compete with integrity. 
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If Bergesen has decided to scrap its vessels in China based on a belief that Chinese scrap yards 
are able to offer better environmental conditions, the company may have reached what Kohlberg 
refers to as the post-conventional level of moral reasoning. Bergesen does, however, not mention 
the importance of working conditions at the scrap yard. The company has not issued a social 
responsibility report, and it is thus difficult to give any concrete answers to whether Bergesen 
admits responsibility for the conditions under which scrap yard workers dismantle its vessels. 
Bergesen’s website (www.bergesen worldwide.com) does not mention ship recycling. 
Environmental responsibility is mentioned on the website of Bergesen Worldwide Gas, but not in 
terms of ship scrapping. 
 
Conclusion on Value Chain Responsibility 
 
Based on the information available through newspapers and press releases Bergesen seems to fit 
in at the conventional level of moral development. According to statements given by the 
company in newspapers Bergesen tries to avoid that the industry code of practice (the 
conventions) is broken (Lloyd’s List October 2003). Bergesen representatives have stated that 
Chinese scrap yards will be preferred in the future due to better environmental conditions (Trade 
Winds August 2003). Statements like these may indicate that Bergesen, as a representative from 
the shipping industry, is striving towards the highest level of moral development, the post-
conventional level described by Kohlberg (1971). To reach this ultimate level, where full value 
chain responsibility is admitted, the shipping company might get some advises from Kohlberg’s 
(1971) five principles of ethical behaviour (see chapter 4):  
 
 
 First of all Bergesen could aim at acting in accordance with the principle of equity. It is 
impossible for a multi national shipping company like Bergesen to ensure that the 
workers at the scrap yards are treated the same way as the employees at Bergesen 
operated vessels. Bergesen does, however, have the ability to influence the working 
conditions at the scrap yards to some extent, by for instance ensuring that the content of 
hazardous waste aboard the vessel is minimized. 
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 Secondly Bergesen could try to enforce the principle of just institutions, by choosing, if 
possible, scrap yards where the workers receive a minimum of nutrition, health and 
education and consumption at a level that ensures survival of future generations. 
 
 Thirdly Bergesen could try to ensure the rights of the individuals who are directly or 
indirectly affected by its activities by engaging itself in activities that aim at improving 
the local circumstances. 
 
 Fourth Bergesen could, since the background institutions are inadequate, try to develop a 
set of values that sets standards above the locally required minimum level. The principle 
of integrity will then be satisfied. 
 
 As the most powerful value chain member, Bergesen may be held responsible for the 
environmental and working conditions at the scrap yards, and to reach the post 
conventional level Bergesen could try to improve these conditions. 
 
 
It is, however, important to note that to fulfil the five principles above Bergesen has to contribute 
with substantial amounts of financial means. As long as the industry code of practice is not 
changed it is unlikely that Bergesen or any other shipping company change practice and admits 
full value chain responsibility. If Bergesen chooses to issue a social responsibility report it would 
be easier to get an overview of its attempts to improve scrap yard conditions.  
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Conclusion on Bergesen 
 
The three areas of ship scrapping described in this report, the economies of ship scrapping, the 
current legislative landscape and the business ethics of shipping companies have clearly affected 
the operations and decisions of Bergesen.  
 
 The company is, like most shipping companies, affected by business cycles, selling fewer 
vessels for scrap as freight rates increase.  
 
 The case of Hesperus clearly illustrates that Bergesen has experienced the effect of the 
regulative framework of the ship scrapping industry, especially in terms of the Basel 
Convention and the Basel Ban.  
 
 Finally business ethics and level of moral development have ensured that Bergesen is 
willing to sell its vessels to Chinese scrap yards with better environmental conditions, 
despite lower scrap prices. Based on information in newspapers and press releases one 
may say that Bergesen has, like many of its industry counterparts, yet to reach the highest 
level of moral maturity, the post-conventional level, where full value chain responsibility 
is admitted. It does, however, seem like Bergesen is striving towards this level. 
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CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the context of the current industry conditions, in terms of the economies of ship scrapping and 
the legislative landscape, does the shipping industry admit value chain responsibility? 
 
In this report the value chain responsibility of shipping companies have been discussed in the 
context of the historical and current industrial framework. Through a focus on three theoretical 
areas affecting the ship scrapping industry, the economies of ship scrapping, the legislative 
landscape and the value chain responsibility of shipping companies, I have aimed at illustrating 
different aspects of the industry.  
 
In chapter 9 I concluded that Bergesen Worldwide, which is a major shipping industry 
participant, is not completely able to admit full value chain responsibility because the company 
has yet to reach what Kohlberg (1971) describes as ‘the post conventional level’ of moral 
maturity. According to the analysis Bergesen has thus far reached the conventional level of 
moral maturity. A company that has reached the conventional level believes that it acts morally 
responsible as long as it does not break the conventions of the society as a whole. Since 90 % of 
all vessels are scrapped at Asian scrap yards under similar conditions as the Bergesen vessels 
have been scrapped, I will anticipate that the shipping industry in general also fits the 
characteristics of the conventional level. In terms of the ship scrapping industry conventional 
moral reasoning implies that the company or industry believes that it is morally obliged to adhere 
to the legislative framework in general and the industry code of practice in specific. 
 
Poor health and safety and environmental protection standards at Asian scrap yards do, however, 
illustrate that the current legislative framework and industry code of practice fail to adequately 
protect the environment and human health. Until now the IMO guidelines on ship recycling has 
been merely voluntary. If the industry code of practice is improved and laws regulate behaviour 
it might be easier for shipping companies like Bergesen to compete with integrity and admit full 
value chain responsibility. 
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A step towards a globally applicable, legally binding regime regulating the scrapping industry 
was taken at the Marine Environment Protection Committee’s  (MEPC), 53rd session in July 
2005. At this meeting it was decided that IMO should develop, as a high priority, a new 
instrument on recycling of vessels. The new IMO regime will contain regulations concerning 
design, construction and operation as well as preparations for scrapping. At its 54th session in 
March 2006 the MEPC made progress in developing the draft text of a mandatory instrument. 
The new instrument should be completely implemented by 2008-2009 (www.imo.org (2)). 
 
Consequently the new regime will be implemented before the expected ship-scrapping boom of 
2010, caused by the decision to phase out single hulled tankers, arises. According to the EU (EU 
2000) the only plausible constraint to future scrapping capacity is environmental and working 
condition related regulation. The new regime may imply that some scrap yards are not able to 
comply with the requirements and are pushed out of business. If capacity at the Asian scrap 
yards that remain in business is driven to its limit, ship owners may have to pay scrap yards to 
get their vessels dismantled, and yards with recycling facilities in developed countries might find 
it favourable to enter the market. If ship owners choose not to scrap their vessels if they have to 
pay a fleet of non-operating vessels will arise. 
 
If the ship scrapping industry is to remain in Asia, where the market conditions are ultimately 
favourable, funding seems to be needed. If it, through funding, is possible to ensure that most 
Asian scrap yards are able to meet the requirements of the new binding IMO regime, and can 
provide socially responsible scrapping of end-of-life vessels, shipping companies like Bergesen 
Worldwide can utilise market conditions like low labour costs and high demand for second hand 
steel in developing countries like India, Bangladesh and China without violating ethical 
commitments. 
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CHAPTER 11 - RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this final chapter of my master thesis I will aim at suggesting recommendations to the 
shipping companies about how they can match corporate responsibility with shipping practice. 
Furthermore I will try to recommend areas within the ship scrapping industry that may be of 
interest for future researchers. 
 
Recommendations 
 
If shipping companies like Bergesen Worldwide are to reach the ultimate level of moral 
responsibility and admit full value chain responsibility, they may have to fundamentally change 
their perception of the ship scrapping industry. If the ship scrapping yard is understood as a 
service provider to the shipping industry rather than a separate dumping industry, and is paid for 
its services by the shipping companies, environmentally sound and socially responsible recycling 
of vessels may be achievable. 
 
Environmentally and socially responsible ship recycling may for instance be financed through a 
ship-recycling fund established by the world’s shipping companies. The shipping companies may 
be obliged to pay contributions to this fund either at the new built phase or during the entire life 
cycle of the vessel. In case of the latter alternative recycling charges may for instance be paid as 
part of the insurance premium of a vessel, ensuring a ‘life insurance’ of the vessel, where future 
dismantling costs are considered. 
 
To ensure the establishment of a recycling fund, a mandatory framework of appropriate 
regulation is necessary, as fund and regulation are interdependent. Globally applicable, binding 
regulation is likely to facilitate change of dumping practices. The introduction of new regulation 
without a parallel financing mechanism may, however, lead to circumvention of the rules, and 
increased illegal use of substandard scrap yards to avoid extra cost. A report developed in 2005 
by ECORYS Transport, ‘The Ship Recycling Fund’ describes how a fund may be developed. 
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Future Research 
 
I would suggest that future research on the ship scrapping industry is carried out to understand 
whether the methods developed for vessel recycling in for instance the Netherlands (see chapter 
6) are possible to transfer to Asian countries, and how such a change in the industry conditions 
might affect obtainable prices of obsolete vessels. Furthermore I would suggest that studies on 
the implications of the decision to phase out single hulled tankers are carried out as the tankers of 
the three respective categories are phased out. Finally the relationship between legislation and 
funding may be of interest for future researchers.  
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 APPENDIX I 
 
Fleet of single hulled oil tankers by category, hull type and year of delivery (Million LDT) 
 
 
 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Total 
 
DB/DS SS Total DB/DS SS Total DB/DS SS Total 
 
Pre 
1970 0 0,2 0,2 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,3 
1970 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,1 
1972 0 0,1 0,1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,1 
1973 0,1 0,1 0,2 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,3 
1974 0 0,4 0,4 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,5 
1975 0,1 0,5 0,6 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,7 
1976 0,1 1 1,1 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 1,2 
1977 0,1 0,6 0,7 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,8 
1978 0,2 0,3 0,5 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,6 
1979 0,1 0,7 0,8 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,9 
1980 0,2 0,8 1 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,2 1,2 
1981 0,4 1 1,4 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,2 1,6 
1982 0 0 0 0,3 0,8 1,2 0 0,1 0,1 1,3 
1983 0 0 0 0,3 0,6 0,9 0,1 0,1 0,2 1,1 
1984 0 0 0 0,2 0,5 0,7 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,9 
1985 0 0 0 0,3 0,4 0,7 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,9 
1986 0 0 0 0,3 0,7 1 0,1 0 0,1 1,1 
1987 0 0 0 0,3 0,5 0,8 0 0,1 0,1 0,9 
1988 0 0 0 0,3 0,7 1 0 0,1 0,1 1,1 
1989 0 0 0 0,3 0,9 1,2 0 0,1 0,1 1,3 
1990 0 0 0 0,2 1,1 1,3 0 0,1 0,1 1,4 
1991 0 0 0 0,3 1,1 1,4 0 0,1 0,1 1,5 
1992 0 0 0 0,3 1,3 1,6 0 0,1 0,1 1,7 
1993 0 0 0 0,2 1,1 1,3 0 0,1 0,1 1,4 
1994 0 0 0 0 0,7 0,7 0 0 0 0,7 
1995 0 0 0 0 0,5 0,5 0 0 0 0,5 
1996 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0 0 0 0,1 
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 1,3 5,7 7 3,3 11 14,4 0,6 2,2 2,8 24,2 
 
Source: Clarkson Research Studies (2006) 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Age profile of current fleet in number of vessels other than single hull oil tankers and share of 
fleet 
 
 
Segment  0-4 
years 
5-9 
years 
10-14 
years 
15-19 
years 
20+ 
years 
Total Average 
Age 
Average 
hist. life 
 Double Hull 
Tanker 
No. 
% 
1,551 
47.5 % 
995 
30.5 % 
445 
13.6 % 
120 
3.7 % 
152 
4.7 % 
3,263 
100 % 
6.0 26.1 
Bulk Carrier 
 
No. 
% 
1,218 
20.2 % 
1,178 
19.5 % 
654 
10.8 % 
631 
10.4 % 
2,357 
39.1 % 
6,038 
100 % 
15.0 25.7 
Combined 
Carrier 
No. 
% 
2 
1.9 % 
7 
6.6 % 
22 
20.7 % 
23 
21.7 % 
52 
49.1 % 
106 
100 % 
17.8 25.2 
Container 
 
No. 
% 
558 
16.5 % 
996 
29.5 % 
725 
21.5 % 
303 
9.0 % 
793 
23.5 % 
3,375 
100% 
11.3 25.4 
Gas 
(LNG+LPG) 
No. 
% 
188 
16 % 
219 
18.6 % 
181 
15.4 % 
117 
10 % 
471 
40.0 % 
1,176 
100 % 
14.8 29.3 
Passenger 
and Ro-Ro 
No. 
% 
104 
19.8 % 
94 
18.0 % 
44 
8.4 % 
107 
20.4 % 
175 
33.4 % 
524 
100 % 
14.5 27.1 
Other cargo 
 
No. 
% 
251 
8.4 % 
753 
25.1 % 
538 
17.9 % 
481 
16.0 % 
974 
32.5 % 
2997 
100 % 
17.4 25.9 
Total 
 
No. 
% 
3,872 
22.2 % 
4,242 
24.3 % 
2,609 
14.9 % 
1,782 
 10.2 % 
4,974 
28.4 % 
17,479 
100 % 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Clarkson Research Studies 2006 
 
